After twenty-two years in the British army \u2014 with deployments in Northern Ireland, Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia \u2014 Richard Ramsey was not ready to retire from the world\u2019s conflict zones. One day, reading a veterans\u2019 magazine, he noticed an advertisement:\u00a0\u201cSecurity expert needed in Sudan.\u201d That job would lead him not only to oil Block 5A in southern Sudan but, a quarter of a century later, to a stone bench outside a courtroom in Stockholm. \u201cAs a former soldier, I\u2019m good at waiting,\u201d Ramsey says as the green light above the heavy oak door remains dark. On Mondays, the court often struggles with technical issues. Around thirty lawyers, prosecutors and defence teams must log in and connect the accused \u2014 Ian Lundin<\/a> and Alex Schneiter<\/a> \u2014 who follow the trial remotely from Geneva.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After more than two years of proceedings, the process has now reached the stage where about ten former security consultants are being heard. Among them is Ramsey.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The prosecution\u2019s case rests heavily on internal security reports that, they argue, show how the Sudanese army and allied militias began a military campaign in May 1999 to secure control over Block 5A \u2013 the oil exploration area of Lundin \u2013 and enable oil operations. Those documents were discovered when Swedish police, on a January 2018 morning, raided Lundin\u2019s Stockholm headquarters. At the same time, Swiss investigators searched the company\u2019s Geneva office and the Lundin brothers\u2019 private premises. According to the prosecution, the documents prove that Lundin requested \u201csecurity\u201d in areas not under government control. That detail is crucial: it is not illegal to cooperate with a military dictatorship \u2014 even during a civil war \u2014 nor to request protection from a state army against rebels. What matters, prosecutors say, is that Lundin understood the consequences of asking the army to \u201csecure\u201d its operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ramsey wrote several of those security reports and received many more. The first document presented to the court describes growing concern in December 1998 that the Sudanese army might enter Block 5A. \u201cIf the army crossed the river to take over the block, they would face resistance,\u201d Ramsey recalls when asked in court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At that time, the company\u2019s protection was handled not by the army but by two local militias: Paulino Matip\u2019s South Sudan United Movement (SSUM) and Tito Biel\u2019s South Sudan Independent Movement (SSIM). This arrangement, Ramsey explains, was based on the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement, \u201cwhich was very important\u201d as the company claimed it gave it the conditions to operate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whether the army entered Block 5A before or after oil was found remains disputed. But 1999 internal reports show that 300 SSUM soldiers under Matip moved south toward the Thar Yath rig, along a newly built road, accompanied by trucks loaded with machine guns. On courtroom screens, prosecutors display a map marking where guards employed by Lundin Oil were captured, bodies found, and gunfire broke the silence on May 3, 1999. Two guards were killed instantly; two others fatally wounded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the analysis section of that report, the conclusion reads: \u201cThe security arrangement based on local militias and police has failed.\u201d The recommendation: responsibility must now shift to the regular army.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That, prosecutors argue, was the turning point \u2014 when oil operations in Block 5A became dependent on military offensives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cReading this, does anything come back to you \u2014 what triggered those events?\u201d prosecutor Henrik Attorps asks. He was in London when the Lundin rig was attacked and several security staff were killed. The rig attack has become a central moment in the prosecution\u2019s timeline. It coincides with what the indictment labels \u201cassistance act 9a\u201d \u2014 May 1999 \u2014 when Ian Lundin, Adolf\u2019s son who was now the company\u2019s chairman, allegedly demanded that the Sudanese army establish a 50-kilometre \u201csecurity zone\u201d around the rig and installations, triggering a series of military operations. That internal document, later seized by police, shows the company requesting \u201cfull military control within a 50-kilometre radius\u201d. Prosecutor Attorps highlights that the company still planned to build new roads into areas it described as \u201chostile\u201d, such as the Jikany region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cCan you explain how the company went from emphasising peaceful conditions to planning roads through hostile territory?\u201d Attorps asks. Did anyone inside the company discuss the civilian impact of this militarisation? \u201cI don\u2019t recall any such discussions,\u201d Ramsey says. \u201cI don\u2019t remember any assessments beyond a general sense that things were tense.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Prosecutors then display another report noting that the World Food Programme had recorded 5.000 displaced people arriving from Leer, Duar and Koch to receive food aid. Villages within block 5A. Ramsey says he has no recollection of such information.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cBy early June, reports speak of thousands fleeing the fighting in Western Upper Nile,\u201d says Attorps. \u201cEven without reading reports, were you aware of displaced civilians from your areas of operation?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cI don\u2019t recall any information like that,\u201d Ramsey answers. \u201cMaybe I knew something then, but not now.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n In another report cited by the prosecution, dated 25 October 1999, Ramsey had written that \u201cthe army is pushing hard into the area\u201d and that a planned field visit was cancelled due to insecurity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWhat did you mean by \u2018pushing hard\u2019?\u201d asks the prosecutor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cI can\u2019t explain that,\u201d Ramsey says flatly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another \u201cWeekly Report,\u201d authored by Ramsey on 24 November 1999, noted that while the army could hold the town of Rubkona and the rig, \u201cthe road to the rig remains the most dangerous stretch.\u201d The report also stated that the army lacked control in Block 5A during the initial stages of road construction, and that the company had therefore requested further military assistance. \u201cI don\u2019t remember this specific report,\u201d Ramsey says, \u201cbut I do recall that the army rarely had the resources to spare.\u201d Asked how the company could continue road construction in such conditions, he again says: \u201cI can\u2019t remember.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n When prosecutors press him on what \u201csubstantial operations\u201d meant, he explains that it probably referred to the number of troops needed to secure the project. \u201cA few battalions would have been necessary,\u201d he says. \u201cEach battalion \u2014 600 to 1000 men. So yes, perhaps a few thousand soldiers in Block 5A that autumn.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 28 February 2000, the army clashed with rebels in Rubkona. The block was evacuated; the situation rated \u201cblack.\u201d The next day, rebels attacked the road-building crew ten kilometres south of Rubkona. Thirteen people were killed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cI remember that day very well,\u201d says Ramsey. \u201cTension was high from previous fighting. When we heard gunfire south of the river, I went to the bridgehead with the company doctor.\u201d Later, he saw soldiers burying bodies in a pit \u2014 men killed in the ambush. The company\u2019s incident log noted that the army was \u201ctrying to bring in reinforcements\u201d and that all operations were being evacuated. \u201cIt was extremely tense,\u201d Ramsey recalls. \u201cCompletely impossible to continue work under those conditions.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Subsequent logs describe more attacks, further deaths, and reinforcements arriving with armour. By mid-March 2000, 500 additional troops were reportedly in Rubkona. Rebel commander Tito Biel was said to have 4.000 men near Bentiu; SPLA-allied forces were joining him. The army, according to one note, began setting fires south of Bentiu \u201cto burn the rebels out.\u201d \u201cI don\u2019t recall those specific events,\u201d Ramsey says. \u201cBut I remember seeing fires in that direction.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n For prosecutors, the issue is threefold: that war crimes occurred; that the accused knew about them; and that their actions enabled those crimes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To demonstrate knowledge, they present minutes and briefing papers showing how the company\u2019s security advisers at following meetings listed the \u201cpros and cons\u201d of the situation. On the \u201cpro\u201d side: an army division moved to Rubkona, checkpoints were established, and an alliance against rebel leader Peter Gadet, an ally of the SPLA, had formed. On the \u201ccon\u201d side: Gadet remained active, and there were no security guarantees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a report dated 18 January 2001, Ramsey summarised the army\u2019s deployment along the rig road and around the large villages of Adok and Leer: one battalion (about 600 men) in Rubkona, two companies (a company is up to 250 men) in Bentiu, and two-three companies along the road and at the rig. \u201cPeter Gadet was the main threat, so we needed forces there,\u201d Ramsey comments in court. But when Christian Aid<\/em> published its 2001 report \u201cScorched Earth\u201d, accusing government and militia forces of crimes against civilians in Block 5A, Ramsey says he never heard of it. \u201cI knew civilians were fleeing,\u201d he admits. \u201cWe had displaced people arriving at our base in Rubkona and at the rig. But the report? No.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet prosecutors then display an internal memo Ramsey himself had written on 7 April 2001 \u2014 titled \u201cRebuttal of Christian Aid Allegations.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cNice one, bravo,\u201d Ramsey says with a smile, prompting laughter in the courtroom, before insisting he did not remember writing it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Reading from Christian Aid\u2019s<\/em> account of villages attacked along the oil road, 11.000 people displaced, and settlements burned, prosecutor Attorps asks:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cDo you have any recollection of these allegations?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cNo,\u201d Ramsey says. \u201cI recognise the village names, but not the incidents.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The following week, another former security adviser takes the stand. John Davidsson is a former British special-forces soldier who later worked for the private firm Rapport Ltd<\/em> to analyse security in Block 5A. \u201cA buffer zone,\u201d he explains, \u201cis a military concept. When protecting an operation, you create concentric rings \u2014 layers of early warning so you\u2019re not surprised.\u201d Those \u201crings,\u201d he says, could include villages, civilians or local informants \u2014 not just soldiers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In his \u201cSecurity Survey Report: Lundin Sudan Ltd Operations in Khartoum and Southern Sudan\u201d (Novembre 2001), Davidsson warned that rebel leader Gadet was targeting oil infrastructure. The report identified Thar Yath and Kwosh as vulnerable to mortar attacks from 7\u201310 kilometres away and recommended building a new road westward to create a protective \u201cbuffer.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cGadet had 120-millimetre mortars,\u201d Davidsson says. \u201cThey\u2019re not precision weapons. They can fly ten kilometres and scatter shrapnel over 100 metres. A road could push the army far enough west to shield the rig.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cSo the company built the road for the army \u2014 to create that buffer?\u201d the prosecutor asks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cExactly.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cDid it make the area safer?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIt made troop transport and evacuation easier. Vital for evacuation, yes.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIf the road hadn\u2019t existed, could the army still have protected operations?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cI have no idea,\u201d Davidsson replies.<\/p>\n\n\n\t The defence seizes on the witnesses\u2019 fading memories. If these men, who lived for years in Block 5A during the alleged crime period, saw no evidence of atrocities, then, the lawyers argued, how could Lundin\u2019s executives have known?<\/p>\n\n\n\n When cross-examined, Ramsey is asked directly:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cDid you ever see burned villages?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cNo.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cDid you ever hear reports of such things?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cNo.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Defence counsel Thomas Tendorf then refers to Ramsey\u2019s earlier testimony that civilians had fled to the company\u2019s compounds in Rubkona and Thar Yath.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThose places were heavily guarded by army troops, correct?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cYes,\u201d Ramsey says.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cSo the civilians sought refuge where the army was. That means they fled from the SPLA rebels \u2014 not from the army.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Defence lawyers also point to internal reports using the term \u201ccordon\u201d to mean securing an area \u201cto keep small bands of bandits away from operations.\u201d Where the prosecutors spoke of \u201carmy guards,\u201d the defence describes a \u201cguard force.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cDid you ever see or hear of the guards killing or abusing civilians?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cNever,\u201d Ramsey answers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As the weeks of testimony continued, the courtroom rhythm slowed. The prosecutors sought details; the defence emphasised doubt. The witnesses \u2014 old soldiers turned oil-company contractors \u2014 often fell back on the same phrase: \u201cI don\u2019t remember.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n For the prosecution, this collective amnesia underlines the distance between the documents and the people who wrote them. For the defence, it reinforces the idea that these men \u2014 and by extension Lundin\u2019s leadership \u2014 neither ordered nor where behind any military campaign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cCould the company go to the army and say, \u2018We want a military operation here or there?\u2019\u201d defence lawyer Tendorf asks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cNo,\u201d Ramsey replies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cDid you ever try?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cNo. I had no interest in demanding offensives, and I don\u2019t think the army would have been interested either.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAs a former British officer, would a national army let a private company influence its operations?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAbsolutely not. They have their own plans and routines.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWhen clashes broke out, what did Lundin Oil do?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWe immediately shut down operations,\u201d Ramsey says. \u201cWe evacuated until the fighting stopped and peace had been negotiated.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Swedish prosecutors are not trying to prove that Lundin itself committed atrocities but that the company\u2019s pursuit of oil aided the army\u2019s campaign of forcible displacement in Block 5A between 1999 and 2003. To do so, they must show that the executives knew what the army was doing, and that their requests for \u201csecurity\u201d amounted to assistance in a war crime. Yet the witnesses called to clarify those crucial years describe events as if they happened to someone else, somewhere else. They acknowledge smoke, gunfire, rumours \u2014 but not orders, not intent. When prosecutors read from the Christian Aid<\/em> report describing entire villages cleared along the oil road Ramsey\u2019s response remains the same: \u201cI recognise the names, but not the incidents.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The same pattern echoed in other testimonies. Mark Reading, Talisman\u2019s former head of security, describes seeing tracer fire over Khartoum one night in 2000, reporting it, then being summoned by an enraged Sudanese security chief who denied any fighting had occurred. \u201cThat\u2019s when I realised what kind of people I was dealing with,\u201d Reading tells the court. When asked whether he knew what the SPLA rebels thought about oil extraction, Reading says simply: \u201cI don\u2019t know what they thought.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cDid SPLA approve of oil operations?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cNo idea. But if you ask whether SPLA-aligned rebels attacked oil infrastructure \u2014 yes, they did.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWhy?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWars in Africa \u2014 in any country \u2014 tend to be about resources. If you lack them, you try to correct that imbalance.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n As the hearings of the former security chiefs draw to a close, the prosecution has built its case not on the men\u2019s recollections but on the paper trail they left behind: weekly situation reports, security analyses, letters to Khartoum. In December the court will hear Ken Barker, the main security chief during the period and the man behind most of the most crucial reports.<\/p>\n\n\nWhen the protectors themselves attack<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
A 50-kilometre \u201cbuffer zone\u201d<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\u201cNo, it\u2019s like reading it for the first time,\u201d Ramsey replies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When news reached him, he recalls thinking that \u201cthe rumours had come true \u2014 the guard force had imploded\u201d. Those meant to protect the rig had instead attacked it. A few days later he was back in Sudan, helping his colleague Dick Deary write a security plan and an incident report. He also met company founder Adolf Lundin soon after.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cBefore the incident, operations were possible \u2014 chaotic but doable,\u201d Ramsey says. \u201cWhen supposedly friendly forces come to your rig, kill people, loot and murder, something changes. We could no longer rely on the hybrid militias. We needed a reliable force \u2014 and the army seemed to be one.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n\u201cI can\u2019t explain that\u201d<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
More attacks, more soldiers, more deaths<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"A](\"https:\/\/www.justiceinfo.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/Sudan_Lundin-oil-security-document.jpg\")
What report?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The \u201cbuffer zone\u201d concept<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Opportunities for the defence<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The \u201ckind of people\u201d you are dealing with<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"Lundin](\"https:\/\/www.justiceinfo.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/South-Sudan_Lundin-trial-corridor_@Olivier-Truc-540x360.jpg\")
<\/div><\/a>\r\n\t\t\t