Lafarge is on trial in the Paris Criminal Court until December 19 for financing terrorist groups in Syria<\/a>. The company is accused of paying nearly \u20ac5 million between 2013 and 2014 to Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nosra, and Ahrar al-Sham to maintain production at its cement plant as the already war-ravaged region fell under the control of jihadists. As well as the company, eight individuals are also on trial, including former Lafarge CEO Bruno Lafont and former deputy CEO Christian H\u00e9rault.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But the most serious charges against the French cement manufacturer remain under investigation. Lafarge, which has since merged with Swiss group Holcim, is also under investigation for complicity in crimes against humanity<\/a>, a decision that was finalized in 2024. That ruling is unprecedented. Never before has a company been prosecuted as a legal entity for such acts, either in France or in any other national or international court. This is an area that falls outside the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, which can only try individuals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The decision sounds like a warning to the biggest companies operating in areas where international crimes are committed. For the first time, it highlights a risk that has been largely ignored until now, as companies can be accused of contributing either directly or indirectly to such crimes. And there is another thing for these operators to note: in September 2021, the Court of Cassation ruled that a company did not need to share the criminal intent of the principal perpetrator to be deemed an \u201caccomplice\u201d, and that desire to preserve its activities did not exempt it from criminal liability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But in reality, awareness is \u201cextremely limited\u201d, says G\u00e9rald Pachoud<\/a>, who helped draft the United Nations Guiding Principles<\/a>\u2014the first global norm addressing the risks of negative business impacts on human rights. As an illustration, he cites the \u201cinstinctive reaction\u201d of executives and their legal departments who, when faced with such accusations, remain on the \u201cdefensive\u201d. \u201cThey tell themselves that they are doing business, and therefore cannot be accomplices to international crimes or have these negative impacts on populations.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pachoud, who is also founder of a consulting firm specialized in corporate responsibility, thinks some firms are now examining these risks \u201cmuch more seriously\u201d. But the fact that management can\u2019t imagine itself to be associated with such \u201cextreme cases\u201d shows a certain \u201cblindness\u201d, he says. He thinks this stems from lack of knowledge and expertise in international criminal and humanitarian law among \u201ccorporate people\u201d. This is despite the fact that the \u201cfew cases\u201d already known\u2014including the major trial currently underway in Sweden against two former senior executives of Lundin Oil<\/a>\u2014should be a \u201cwake-up call\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n For Lafarge is no longer an isolated case. In its wake, there have been many more complaints for similar acts filed in France. They target TotalEnergies, Dassault Aviation, Thal\u00e8s, MBDA France, the Castel group, and BNP Paribas. The French National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor\u2019s Office (PNAT) has confirmed to Justice Info that around ten investigations and judicial inquiries are currently open against French companies, all relating to human rights violations and complicity in international crimes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These proceedings are also causing concern among financial institutions. According to several sources interviewed, some banks are suspending or reviewing their financing when a company is the subject of a complaint, pending clarification on the legal consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, it seems that neither the Lafarge case nor the numerous complaints filed in its wake have really changed the way economic actors perceive and understand their responsibility. This is certainly the opinion of the various observers Justice Info interviewed, as none of the multinationals contacted wished to respond. Thal\u00e8s stated that it did not wish to comment \u201con this type of subject\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So it is difficult to say whether companies have stepped up their due diligence or whether they are effectively integrating the need to protect human rights into their operational practices -- beyond charters and commitments posted on their websites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When the situation requires, as in the Lafarge affair, companies may set up committees and audits designed to identify risks and ensure follow-up. But the methodologies for assessing these risks remain \u201cvery abstract\u201d, according to Cannelle Lavite of the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), who has sometimes had the opportunity to consult them in the context of proceedings initiated by her NGO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What she observes is that they are more mechanisms aimed at protecting the company from legal and reputational risk than a genuine due diligence process to identify, prevent, and avoid the risk of human rights violations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This distinction is not always clear to companies, \u201cwhich sometimes want us to forget that they have enormous financial and operational resources enabling them to mobilize a host of experts\u201d, the lawyer continues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As an example, Lavite cites informal exchanges with people in the arms sector. She says legal officials in \u201cfairly senior positions\u201d have confided in her about their difficulties making themselves heard internally, acknowledged the limitations of these compliance mechanisms and the need to recruit people specifically trained in human rights. But such specialists are considered \u201crare\u201d, she reports, because they are also required to propose solutions that are \u201cadapted to the corporate environment\u201d and its \u201cprofit and commercial objectives\u201d. If they are finally recruited, their recommendations are not incorporated into the company\u2019s strategic plans if deemed incompatible with these objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is where the real paradigm lies, says the lawyer. Companies must identify the risks of human rights violations, but they will not be able to do so \u201cuntil they accept that this is part of their business model\u201d or that \u201crespecting human rights may mean reducing their profit margin while they check their entire value chain\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Are companies really unaware of the risks, or do they simply prefer to ignore them? Lucie, who did not want to reveal her real identity, is a former analyst. She worked for several months for French economic intelligence agency ADIT, a discreet agency with sometimes opaque practices. It is partly composed, according to Lucie, of former members of the French foreign ministry and ex-agents of the General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), the French intelligence service. ADIT offers services mainly in consulting and risk analysis, but more broadly in the fields of security and economic intelligence. It also offers support to French companies operating internationally, and participated in the first French delegation to Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, at the initiative of MEDEF, the French employers\u2019 union.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Within the agency, Lucie was in charge of risk analysis for companies \u201cthat needed to ensure compliance\u201d \u2013 bringing the company into line with rules and ethics \u2013 in a region of the world she describes as sensitive and where \u201cthe risks are extremely present\u201d. Her job was to verify the identity of local partners working with these groups, including small-scale service providers like meal suppliers, and also analyse their \u201cnetworks\u201d. \u201cWho are they? Do they have links to armed groups, militias, politicians? Are they subject to international sanctions? What is their reputation, including in terms of human rights violations or corruption?\u201d she explains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Lucie says such investigations are generally conducted using open sources. But they can also draw on local contacts mobilized by ADIT. \u201cThese may be people who have other jobs but are paid by the agency on an ad hoc basis for their information, or people who have made it their business,\u201d she continues. \u201cThey interview people on the ground, consult archives, and sometimes take photos.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIn most cases,\u201d Lucie recalls, \u201cthese analyses identify legal or reputational risks. But that\u2019s where the analyst\u2019s work ends, as they don\u2019t know what companies do with this information. \u201cFrom what my managers have told me, some companies may consider that it is better to cooperate locally, despite the risk, given the security or political balance, often both. Basically, it\u2019s the idea that \u2018that's how things work over there!\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\t \u201cIt is often the case that such analyses are not followed up,\u201d confirms Zimeray. But the lawyer thinks these analyses apply overly standardized methodologies that do not always allow companies to properly understand their criminal liability\u2014insofar as the \u201crisk\u201d, which is currently \u201cpoorly estimated and mapped\u201d, also depends on \u201cthe geopolitical situation, the network of NGOs in the area concerned, and evaluation of the tolerance threshold of local populations\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Lucie says analyses vary in depth depending on the company\u2019s request. Those that truly incorporate international criminal law and humanitarian law remain in the minority, notes Pachoud. But Lucie says large multinationals often have a fairly dense network of information sources. In addition to consulting firms and economic intelligence agencies, she cites possible exchanges between local company managers and diplomatic or intelligence services. \u201cIn some countries, French firms meet with embassy representatives every week,\u201d she points out. Added to this are internal legal departments, risk or security teams, sometimes based in the field, as well as human rights officers\u2014those \u201crare profiles\u201d that have been integrated into organizational charts in recent years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This raises the question: how do these companies actually decide between what is identified as a risk and what they are willing to accept to preserve their activities?<\/p>\n\n\n\n In France, large companies are already demonstrating their commitment to human rights as part of implementing the duty of care law, says Pachoud. \u201cBut because of their lack of expertise, they separate the issue of respect for human rights from that of respect for humanitarian law or, worse, international criminal law.\u201d This leads them, he believes, to \u201cpoor analysis\u201d. \u201cRather than assessing the risk, management and legal departments will first look for reasons why their responsibility would not apply. That\u2019s how they analyse their environment,\u201d he says.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This ambivalence is also evident in a recent report<\/a> by the Club des jurists, a liberal French think tank, on corporate criminal liability in the area of human rights. While acknowledging the increase in prosecutions and the rise in criminal risk, the report particularly recommends, broadening \u201ceconomic diplomacy missions\u201d in France and Europe and sharing information on potential \u201cthreats\u201d with companies, including those related to human rights violations \u201cin a competitive context\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cEconomic actors need legal certainty,\u201d stresses Didier Rebut, author of the report and professor of law at Paris-Panth\u00e9on-Assas University. He says companies are \u201calerted\u201d but \u201cdon\u2019t know how to manage [the risk], because they are facing a risk that is still poorly defined, something \u201cthey didn't see coming\u201d. The professor thinks they need \u201ca diplomatic interlocutor\u201d capable of both clarifying red lines and providing them with operational advice on what to do and what not to do. Admittedly, the largest companies have the economic means to cope, Rebut concedes, \u201cbut perhaps not small and medium-sized companies\u201d. \u201cI am not saying that we have the right to do anything just because diplomats say it is OK,\u201d he continues. \u201cBut they can help make decisions.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cExtremely limited\u201d awareness<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\u201cVery abstract\u201d risk assessment methodologies<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Incompatible objectives<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThat\u2019s how things work over there!\u201d<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
A network of information sources<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Taking risks rather than losses<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Gaza, a turning point<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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