JUSTICE INFO IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS<\/p>\n
Richard Rogers<\/strong><\/h2>\nHuman rights lawyer<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
JUSTICE INFO: The definition of a sanctions regime is a set of restrictive measures imposed by one or more countries against another country, organization, or individual, to achieve foreign policy goals. There exist lots of sets of sanctions, including on trade, but what we seem to be interested in here is what is called the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act<\/a>. Could you go back to the origin of it \u2013 when, how and why this sanction regime was created?<\/h2>\n\n\n\nRICHARD ROGERS: Well, there\u2019s not only the Global Magnitsky Act, but that\u2019s certainly the most well-known one. Pre Magnitsky sanctions regimes targeted entire States. They would impose trade embargoes, financial isolation, etc. But those ultimately were seen as pretty blunt instruments, and not as effective as they could have been, because they affected entire populations; while the political and military elites simply adapted and stashed money in offshore accounts, and even profited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So, from about the late 2000s onwards, the Western States adapted their approach, and they brought in these individualized, targeted sanctions regimes where sanctions would hit the actual decision makers, the enablers, and the beneficiaries of the abuses. The idea was to hit these individuals where it hurt by preventing them from traveling or from shopping in the West, freezing their assets, and undermining their ability to do business through the Western financial systems. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It all started, really, with the Magnitsky Act in 2012. That was a U.S. act that targeted a group of Russians who had effectively murdered Sergei Magnitsky, who was the lawyer for Bill Browder, a British American financier who had been working and investing in Russia. The act was seen as quite effective. And Bill Browder went on to lobby the U.S. Congress to adopt a global version of that act. In 2016, the U.S. brought in this Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act which allowed the U.S. to sanction foreign individuals who were responsible either for human rights abuses or for significant corruption. The tools included asset freezes, bans on using the U.S. dollar system \u2013 which is quite extensive \u2013 and travel restrictions. And not only for the individual perpetrators, but also for their family and for their businesses. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
So if you\u2019re sanctioned by the U.S., you can\u2019t travel to the U.S., and U.S. nationals can\u2019t deal with you \u2013 you can\u2019t get American lawyers, accountants, investors, to support your businesses. If you have property in the U.S., it\u2019s likely to be frozen. Depending on the wording of the sanctions, your family may not be able to get visas for the U.S. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Many of the corrupt elites have their kids in universities in America; their wives go shopping in London and New York. Whether being designated by the U.S. makes a big difference or not depends on your lifestyle. But because the world still relies on the U.S. dollar so much within financial systems, U.S. sanctions normally touch on people\u2019s lives, one way or another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nBy 2020, practically the whole of the West had individualized, targeted sanctions regimes to target human rights abuses and corruption. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Ultimately, these targeted sanctions were seen as an effective tool. After the Global Magnitsky Act, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union brought in copy-cat Acts, which did similar things. So by 2020, practically the whole of the West had individualized, targeted sanctions regimes to target human rights abuses and corruption. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Then, on top of that, there may be more specific regimes that came in relating to specific countries or specific events. An example of that are the sanctions relating to Belarus. In 2020, there was a stolen election and civil demonstrations in Belarus, followed by a violent crackdown by the regime. Hundreds of protesters were beaten, many were killed, and thousands imprisoned unfairly. The EU and the UK adopted specific Acts to target individuals who were involved in that repression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It\u2019s implemented for a specific situation, and for a specific amount of time, but it works under the same principles?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Yes, and it might be broader. For example, in relation to Ukraine, there are many different sanctions regimes that might target a whole sector \u2013 those who are supporting the occupation [by Russia] through financial institutions, or those who are supporting the Russian war through the energy sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So it can be sector specific, it can be event specific. But the idea is always to target individuals, their families, and their companies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When did it become a useful tool for human rights activists or lawyers like you?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
I was involved to a very small extent with lobbying for the Global Magnitsky Act. So I knew that was coming, and as soon as it was adopted, I was filing applications under that Act. For example, I used it to target corrupt human rights abusers from the Cambodian regime. With some success. The Americans sanctioned Kun Kim<\/a>, who was the deputy supreme commander of the Cambodian Armed Forces. He was sanctioned for corruption and human rights abuses. He had about five companies sanctioned, and several family members as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"Kun](\"https:\/\/www.justiceinfo.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/Cambodia_Kun-Kim-speech_@Tang-Chhin-Sothy-AFP.jpg\")
Kun Kim, the former deputy commander-in-chief of the Cambodian Armed Forces, has been placed on the U.S. sanctions list for corruption and human rights violations, along with five of his companies and several members of his family. Photo: \u00a9 Tang Chhin Sothy \/ AFP<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nAnd how efficient was that? <\/h2>\n\n\n\n
It\u2019s hard to tell what effect sanctions have on the targeted person. It\u2019s very difficult to measure. Unfortunately, most of those who are targeted are already so wealthy and connected that they can adapt without affecting their lives too much. But it\u2019s fair to work on the assumption that designation does have a deterrent effect. And in some, perhaps many cases, it changes people\u2019s behaviours.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Which is the point?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Which is exactly the point. The idea of individualised sanctions is to prevent people from committing human rights abuses or pursuing corrupt practices, and to change their behaviour to conform with Western foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nIf you file a case to a human rights court, it will take years to get a result. But, if you\u2019re lucky, you can file a request for sanctions and get a result within weeks or months.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
How wide the use of sanctions regimes by human rights lawyers became after the Magnitsky Act? Would you say that this tool proved to be a powerful new avenue for you to take action, in the absence of other criminal justice options, for instance?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
They\u2019ve been incredibly useful. Partly because they can be much quicker than a judicial process. If you file a case to a human rights court, it will take years to get a result, the same with the International Criminal Court (ICC), or with universal jurisdiction cases. But, if you\u2019re lucky, you can file a request for sanctions and get a result within weeks or months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Secondly, the evidential standard is much lower. Because it is not a judicial decision, you don\u2019t have to meet the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, or even the balance of probabilities. You simply have to convince those working in the U.S. Treasury or State Department, or the equivalent in the UK or Europe, that there is a reasonable case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Could you give us a couple of concrete examples of typical situations in which you would use or activate the sanctions regime?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Let\u2019s take the example of Cambodia, where there is an autocratic kleptocracy, where many members of the ruling elite commit acts of corruption and, inevitably, human rights abuses. This is a very good example where the U.S. or the UK or the EU might want to act to try to influence behaviour. Because those corrupt officials almost always have property or businesses in the West, if they are sanctioned, their property will be frozen, they won\u2019t be able to use it \u2013 it won\u2019t be confiscated, but it will be frozen for the period of the sanctions \u2013 and it will be difficult for them to use Western financial systems. Money flows will be undermined for them. That can be very effective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Another example is Belarus. We [Global Diligence] did research into the judges and prosecutors who were involved in the unfair trials of protestors. Judges and prosecutors were using the power of the state as a tool of repression, rather than acting as an independent judiciary. We filed an application to the EU and it sanctioned judicial actors, in addition to security officials. They sanctioned quite a large number of judges and prosecutors off the back of that work. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nCertainly in the past, there has been a reluctance to sanction judges and prosecutors. It has been done, but it seems to have been a very high bar, understandably.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Was it the first time you were targeting judges and prosecutors?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
No, it was the second time. After the success of our application in relation to Kun Kim, we filed a second application on Cambodia. This was broader and identified some very senior members of the judiciary who were undoubtedly acting as tools of the regime, who were ensuring that the legal system was not independent, and was simply a way for the ruling elite to consolidate their power, to commit human rights abuses, and to steal money. We filed an application to the U.S. requesting designation of the head of the judiciary and others. But they did not. So that one was unsuccessful.
Certainly in the past, there has been a reluctance to sanction judges and prosecutors. It has been done, but it seems to have been a very high bar, understandably. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Would they give you an explanation when they do not grant your application?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
No. They don\u2019t really give any reasons to the organizations that submit applications. A decision is made, and you are informed when the decision to sanction people is published. Generally, you don\u2019t get feedback if there\u2019s a decision not to sanction. It depends to some extent on your personal relationship. The U.S. are actually more accessible than the UK in terms of engaging with civil society on these issues. Human Rights First is the main non-profit organization based in Washington DC dealing with sanctions. It has a very close relationship with the Office of Foreign Assets Control \u2013 OFAC \u2013 at the Department of the Treasury that deals with sanctions. Through Human Rights First, we did have face-to-face meetings with OFAC officials to discuss applications. But they would not say what they were going to do. <\/p>\n\n\n\t
\r\n\t\tFIND THIS ARTICLE INTERESTING?<\/div>\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t\tSign up now for our (free) newsletter<\/a> to make sure you don't miss out on other publications of this type. \t\t<\/div>\r\n\t<\/div>\r\n\t\n\n\nIf we go back to the definition, it\u2019s clear that the sanction regime is to achieve foreign policy goals. It was meant to be used for political purposes. For instance, the Trump\u2019s administration is currently working on a fresh set of sanctions that is expected to target senior security officials from Rwanda, because the U.S. is demanding the withdrawal of the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in Eastern Congo from areas that were conquered by the M23 since the signing of a peace agreement supported by the U.S. between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda last December. Because the agreement was not respected, that\u2019s how the U.S. now wants to put pressure on Rwanda. Is this a classic use of the sanction regime?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Yes, very much. It\u2019s about using this political, diplomatic tool to influence actors to operate in a way that conforms to the foreign policy goals. It might include sanctions against individual actors in countries that allow China to build large ports for their navy, for example. It might include sanctions against political actors who are fuelling conflict within their country. These relate to foreign policy goals of the U.S. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
So from the beginning, sanctions regimes are this ambiguous, or double-edged, sword-like system: it was not only about being a good moral, human rights tool, it was highly political.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Yes, they\u2019ve always been political. Generally, The U.S., the UK, the EU, will not be sanctioning friendly countries, or individuals that are close to the regimes in friendly countries, even if they are corrupt, even if they are committing human rights abuses. It\u2019s very much a diplomatic tool that is used to target enemies, or individuals in countries that are seen as unfriendly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nWhat\u2019s changed under the current U.S. administration is that the ICC is seen as threatening the U.S. interests by targeting U.S. allies, key U.S. allies in the Middle East.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
So based on what you told us, in what sense the sanctions against ICC senior prosecutors and judges are a clear departure from past practices?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Firstly, you\u2019ve got to remember that Western countries have targeted judicial officials before, like in the example that I gave on Belarus. What\u2019s different today is not the use of sanctions, but who or what is considered to be \u2018friendly\u2019, and who or what is considered to be for or against foreign policy interests. That\u2019s what\u2019s changed. Previously, the ICC, as an international judicial organization, was generally seen as friendly to the West. The Americans were always skeptical about the ICC, but it certainly wasn\u2019t seen as working against the U.S.\u2019s foreign policy interests. What\u2019s changed under the current U.S. administration is that the ICC is seen as threatening the U.S. interests by targeting U.S. allies, key U.S. allies in the Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Meaning Israel.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Yes. So it\u2019s not completely inconsistent with the U.S. use of sanctions in the past, in the sense that they\u2019ve used sanctions to target individuals or bodies that they consider to be against the U.S. foreign policy interests. What has changed is the group they consider to be friends or foe.
I should also say that, when the EU sanctioned Belarusian judges, it was on the basis that they weren\u2019t acting as independent arbiters. They were acting as tools of a repressive regime. So it\u2019s quite a different circumstance to the ICC judges. I don\u2019t think there are allegations that the ICC judges are somehow corrupt, or that the ICC is simply a tool for some kind of repressive international organization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is very much a signal from the U.S. that it\u2019s prepared to use sanctions to influence judicial decisions that affect its perceived security interests. It\u2019s not going to stop at sanctioning political, military or business leaders in certain enemy or neutral countries; it\u2019s prepared to go further than that and to target individuals in international organizations. As far as I know, the Trump administration has been the only one who has targeted officials within an international organization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nWhen Russia sanctions, it doesn\u2019t have the same consequences for the individual \u2013 not traveling to Russia is not a big deal and the target person is not going to be blocked from a major banking system.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Russia also has its own targets and sanctions regimes. But, of course, when Russia sanctions, it doesn\u2019t have the same consequences for the individual \u2013 not traveling to Russia is not a big deal and the target person is not going to be blocked from a major banking system. Russian sanctions simply don\u2019t matter nearly as much as sanctions from the U.S., or even the EU or the UK.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Once you\u2019re on the list of U.S. sanctions, how do you get off?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
You can apply to OFAC to remove the sanctions. And generally, there can be two angles: that there was no basis for the designation in the first place, there wasn\u2019t sufficient evidence to support the allegation; or, you can show that your behaviour has changed since the sanctions were imposed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For ICC judges and prosecutors, they could presumably also apply to the U.S. to have their designation removed. They could argue that the underlying basis for the sanctions is not supported by the evidence, that the prosecutorial and judicial acts were not an \u2018extraordinary threat\u2019 to U.S. national security interests and were not politically motivated or selective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The second option is to show how they\u2019ve changed their behaviour. That\u2019s more difficult for the judges, because they\u2019re very unlikely to reverse the decisions that they\u2019ve made on Israel\u2026 that would effectively demonstrate that they are not independent. It would almost prove the point of the U.S., but the other way around. So that\u2019s not a realistic option for them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Failing that, they may be able to lodge an appeal through the U.S. courts. But the courts give the U.S. government a lot of leeway. So I\u2019m not sure how successful either of these avenues would be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"M23](\"https:\/\/www.justiceinfo.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/DRCongo-M23-soldiers_Alexis-Huguet-AFP.jpg\")
The United States is using the threat of sanctions to pressure Rwanda into withdrawing its support for the M23 (pictured here in Goma in February 2025), an armed rebel group that controls part of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Photo: \u00a9 Alexis Huguet \/ AFP<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n\nI don\u2019t think there\u2019s any need to amend the Magnitsky Act. It has a huge amount of discretion built into it already. So different regimes will use it in different ways.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Would you say that the Trump\u2019s administration move against ICC judges to some extent has changed the credibility of the U.S. sanctions regime? Could human rights lawyers like you keep using it in the future and ignore the way it has been used against themselves by the same government? Can you be blind to its abuse and use it when it goes your way? And finally, will there be a need to amend the Magnitsky Act once the Trump era is over? <\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Well, firstly, I don\u2019t think there\u2019s any need to amend the Magnitsky Act. It has a huge amount of discretion built into it already. So different regimes will use it in different ways. I think it\u2019s relatively normal to expect a shift in foreign policy between different administrations in the U.S. And with that shift in foreign policy, there will be a shift in the targets, because the Magnitsky Act is about targeting those who are considered to be working against U.S. national interests, U.S. security interests. And that will change according to the administration and their priorities. So there\u2019s no need to amend the Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In terms of whether human rights lawyers should boycott using the Global Magnitsky, obviously that\u2019s a question for every individual lawyer. But there are only so many options available for human rights lawyers to make a difference. And if they can keep using the sanctions regimes to target the bad guys and make a positive difference in poor countries where victims are still suffering, then it\u2019ll be difficult to give up that option. There are so few options available. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yes, the U.S. has shifted its emphasis. But there still is an overlap between what human rights lawyers want to achieve, and what the administration wants to achieve. Take the example of Rwanda: many people working on the DRC want to see Rwanda withdraw from the Congo, because the M23 are committing horrendous acts in Eastern DRC. So to put pressure on Rwanda to withdraw its support and influence on M23 is very welcome. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The same goes for Iran [This interview was recorded prior to the armed attack of the US against Iran<\/em>]. There\u2019s a lot of convergence of interest between human rights activists, both on the ground in Iran and abroad, with the Trump administration\u2019s approach to influencing the Iranian regime. So, it\u2019s not that the Trump administration doesn\u2019t do anything that\u2019s supported by human rights lawyers. It\u2019s just that there is a different emphasis, and there are very obvious examples when it acts in a way that is contrary to what\u2019s generally favoured by international human rights lawyers. <\/p>\n\n\n
RICHARD ROGERS: Well, there\u2019s not only the Global Magnitsky Act, but that\u2019s certainly the most well-known one. Pre Magnitsky sanctions regimes targeted entire States. They would impose trade embargoes, financial isolation, etc. But those ultimately were seen as pretty blunt instruments, and not as effective as they could have been, because they affected entire populations; while the political and military elites simply adapted and stashed money in offshore accounts, and even profited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So, from about the late 2000s onwards, the Western States adapted their approach, and they brought in these individualized, targeted sanctions regimes where sanctions would hit the actual decision makers, the enablers, and the beneficiaries of the abuses. The idea was to hit these individuals where it hurt by preventing them from traveling or from shopping in the West, freezing their assets, and undermining their ability to do business through the Western financial systems. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It all started, really, with the Magnitsky Act in 2012. That was a U.S. act that targeted a group of Russians who had effectively murdered Sergei Magnitsky, who was the lawyer for Bill Browder, a British American financier who had been working and investing in Russia. The act was seen as quite effective. And Bill Browder went on to lobby the U.S. Congress to adopt a global version of that act. In 2016, the U.S. brought in this Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act which allowed the U.S. to sanction foreign individuals who were responsible either for human rights abuses or for significant corruption. The tools included asset freezes, bans on using the U.S. dollar system \u2013 which is quite extensive \u2013 and travel restrictions. And not only for the individual perpetrators, but also for their family and for their businesses. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
So if you\u2019re sanctioned by the U.S., you can\u2019t travel to the U.S., and U.S. nationals can\u2019t deal with you \u2013 you can\u2019t get American lawyers, accountants, investors, to support your businesses. If you have property in the U.S., it\u2019s likely to be frozen. Depending on the wording of the sanctions, your family may not be able to get visas for the U.S. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Many of the corrupt elites have their kids in universities in America; their wives go shopping in London and New York. Whether being designated by the U.S. makes a big difference or not depends on your lifestyle. But because the world still relies on the U.S. dollar so much within financial systems, U.S. sanctions normally touch on people\u2019s lives, one way or another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nBy 2020, practically the whole of the West had individualized, targeted sanctions regimes to target human rights abuses and corruption. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Ultimately, these targeted sanctions were seen as an effective tool. After the Global Magnitsky Act, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union brought in copy-cat Acts, which did similar things. So by 2020, practically the whole of the West had individualized, targeted sanctions regimes to target human rights abuses and corruption. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Then, on top of that, there may be more specific regimes that came in relating to specific countries or specific events. An example of that are the sanctions relating to Belarus. In 2020, there was a stolen election and civil demonstrations in Belarus, followed by a violent crackdown by the regime. Hundreds of protesters were beaten, many were killed, and thousands imprisoned unfairly. The EU and the UK adopted specific Acts to target individuals who were involved in that repression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It\u2019s implemented for a specific situation, and for a specific amount of time, but it works under the same principles?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Yes, and it might be broader. For example, in relation to Ukraine, there are many different sanctions regimes that might target a whole sector \u2013 those who are supporting the occupation [by Russia] through financial institutions, or those who are supporting the Russian war through the energy sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So it can be sector specific, it can be event specific. But the idea is always to target individuals, their families, and their companies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When did it become a useful tool for human rights activists or lawyers like you?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
I was involved to a very small extent with lobbying for the Global Magnitsky Act. So I knew that was coming, and as soon as it was adopted, I was filing applications under that Act. For example, I used it to target corrupt human rights abusers from the Cambodian regime. With some success. The Americans sanctioned Kun Kim<\/a>, who was the deputy supreme commander of the Cambodian Armed Forces. He was sanctioned for corruption and human rights abuses. He had about five companies sanctioned, and several family members as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Kun Kim, the former deputy commander-in-chief of the Cambodian Armed Forces, has been placed on the U.S. sanctions list for corruption and human rights violations, along with five of his companies and several members of his family. Photo: \u00a9 Tang Chhin Sothy \/ AFP<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n And how efficient was that? <\/h2>\n\n\n\n
It\u2019s hard to tell what effect sanctions have on the targeted person. It\u2019s very difficult to measure. Unfortunately, most of those who are targeted are already so wealthy and connected that they can adapt without affecting their lives too much. But it\u2019s fair to work on the assumption that designation does have a deterrent effect. And in some, perhaps many cases, it changes people\u2019s behaviours.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Which is the point?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Which is exactly the point. The idea of individualised sanctions is to prevent people from committing human rights abuses or pursuing corrupt practices, and to change their behaviour to conform with Western foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nIf you file a case to a human rights court, it will take years to get a result. But, if you\u2019re lucky, you can file a request for sanctions and get a result within weeks or months.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
How wide the use of sanctions regimes by human rights lawyers became after the Magnitsky Act? Would you say that this tool proved to be a powerful new avenue for you to take action, in the absence of other criminal justice options, for instance?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
They\u2019ve been incredibly useful. Partly because they can be much quicker than a judicial process. If you file a case to a human rights court, it will take years to get a result, the same with the International Criminal Court (ICC), or with universal jurisdiction cases. But, if you\u2019re lucky, you can file a request for sanctions and get a result within weeks or months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Secondly, the evidential standard is much lower. Because it is not a judicial decision, you don\u2019t have to meet the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, or even the balance of probabilities. You simply have to convince those working in the U.S. Treasury or State Department, or the equivalent in the UK or Europe, that there is a reasonable case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Could you give us a couple of concrete examples of typical situations in which you would use or activate the sanctions regime?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Let\u2019s take the example of Cambodia, where there is an autocratic kleptocracy, where many members of the ruling elite commit acts of corruption and, inevitably, human rights abuses. This is a very good example where the U.S. or the UK or the EU might want to act to try to influence behaviour. Because those corrupt officials almost always have property or businesses in the West, if they are sanctioned, their property will be frozen, they won\u2019t be able to use it \u2013 it won\u2019t be confiscated, but it will be frozen for the period of the sanctions \u2013 and it will be difficult for them to use Western financial systems. Money flows will be undermined for them. That can be very effective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Another example is Belarus. We [Global Diligence] did research into the judges and prosecutors who were involved in the unfair trials of protestors. Judges and prosecutors were using the power of the state as a tool of repression, rather than acting as an independent judiciary. We filed an application to the EU and it sanctioned judicial actors, in addition to security officials. They sanctioned quite a large number of judges and prosecutors off the back of that work. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nCertainly in the past, there has been a reluctance to sanction judges and prosecutors. It has been done, but it seems to have been a very high bar, understandably.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Was it the first time you were targeting judges and prosecutors?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
No, it was the second time. After the success of our application in relation to Kun Kim, we filed a second application on Cambodia. This was broader and identified some very senior members of the judiciary who were undoubtedly acting as tools of the regime, who were ensuring that the legal system was not independent, and was simply a way for the ruling elite to consolidate their power, to commit human rights abuses, and to steal money. We filed an application to the U.S. requesting designation of the head of the judiciary and others. But they did not. So that one was unsuccessful.
Certainly in the past, there has been a reluctance to sanction judges and prosecutors. It has been done, but it seems to have been a very high bar, understandably. <\/p>\n\n\n\nWould they give you an explanation when they do not grant your application?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
No. They don\u2019t really give any reasons to the organizations that submit applications. A decision is made, and you are informed when the decision to sanction people is published. Generally, you don\u2019t get feedback if there\u2019s a decision not to sanction. It depends to some extent on your personal relationship. The U.S. are actually more accessible than the UK in terms of engaging with civil society on these issues. Human Rights First is the main non-profit organization based in Washington DC dealing with sanctions. It has a very close relationship with the Office of Foreign Assets Control \u2013 OFAC \u2013 at the Department of the Treasury that deals with sanctions. Through Human Rights First, we did have face-to-face meetings with OFAC officials to discuss applications. But they would not say what they were going to do. <\/p>\n\n\n\t
\r\n\t\tFIND THIS ARTICLE INTERESTING?<\/div>\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t\tSign up now for our (free) newsletter<\/a> to make sure you don't miss out on other publications of this type. \t\t<\/div>\r\n\t<\/div>\r\n\t\n\n\nIf we go back to the definition, it\u2019s clear that the sanction regime is to achieve foreign policy goals. It was meant to be used for political purposes. For instance, the Trump\u2019s administration is currently working on a fresh set of sanctions that is expected to target senior security officials from Rwanda, because the U.S. is demanding the withdrawal of the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in Eastern Congo from areas that were conquered by the M23 since the signing of a peace agreement supported by the U.S. between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda last December. Because the agreement was not respected, that\u2019s how the U.S. now wants to put pressure on Rwanda. Is this a classic use of the sanction regime?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Yes, very much. It\u2019s about using this political, diplomatic tool to influence actors to operate in a way that conforms to the foreign policy goals. It might include sanctions against individual actors in countries that allow China to build large ports for their navy, for example. It might include sanctions against political actors who are fuelling conflict within their country. These relate to foreign policy goals of the U.S. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
So from the beginning, sanctions regimes are this ambiguous, or double-edged, sword-like system: it was not only about being a good moral, human rights tool, it was highly political.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Yes, they\u2019ve always been political. Generally, The U.S., the UK, the EU, will not be sanctioning friendly countries, or individuals that are close to the regimes in friendly countries, even if they are corrupt, even if they are committing human rights abuses. It\u2019s very much a diplomatic tool that is used to target enemies, or individuals in countries that are seen as unfriendly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nWhat\u2019s changed under the current U.S. administration is that the ICC is seen as threatening the U.S. interests by targeting U.S. allies, key U.S. allies in the Middle East.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
So based on what you told us, in what sense the sanctions against ICC senior prosecutors and judges are a clear departure from past practices?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Firstly, you\u2019ve got to remember that Western countries have targeted judicial officials before, like in the example that I gave on Belarus. What\u2019s different today is not the use of sanctions, but who or what is considered to be \u2018friendly\u2019, and who or what is considered to be for or against foreign policy interests. That\u2019s what\u2019s changed. Previously, the ICC, as an international judicial organization, was generally seen as friendly to the West. The Americans were always skeptical about the ICC, but it certainly wasn\u2019t seen as working against the U.S.\u2019s foreign policy interests. What\u2019s changed under the current U.S. administration is that the ICC is seen as threatening the U.S. interests by targeting U.S. allies, key U.S. allies in the Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Meaning Israel.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Yes. So it\u2019s not completely inconsistent with the U.S. use of sanctions in the past, in the sense that they\u2019ve used sanctions to target individuals or bodies that they consider to be against the U.S. foreign policy interests. What has changed is the group they consider to be friends or foe.
I should also say that, when the EU sanctioned Belarusian judges, it was on the basis that they weren\u2019t acting as independent arbiters. They were acting as tools of a repressive regime. So it\u2019s quite a different circumstance to the ICC judges. I don\u2019t think there are allegations that the ICC judges are somehow corrupt, or that the ICC is simply a tool for some kind of repressive international organization.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThis is very much a signal from the U.S. that it\u2019s prepared to use sanctions to influence judicial decisions that affect its perceived security interests. It\u2019s not going to stop at sanctioning political, military or business leaders in certain enemy or neutral countries; it\u2019s prepared to go further than that and to target individuals in international organizations. As far as I know, the Trump administration has been the only one who has targeted officials within an international organization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nWhen Russia sanctions, it doesn\u2019t have the same consequences for the individual \u2013 not traveling to Russia is not a big deal and the target person is not going to be blocked from a major banking system.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Russia also has its own targets and sanctions regimes. But, of course, when Russia sanctions, it doesn\u2019t have the same consequences for the individual \u2013 not traveling to Russia is not a big deal and the target person is not going to be blocked from a major banking system. Russian sanctions simply don\u2019t matter nearly as much as sanctions from the U.S., or even the EU or the UK.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Once you\u2019re on the list of U.S. sanctions, how do you get off?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
You can apply to OFAC to remove the sanctions. And generally, there can be two angles: that there was no basis for the designation in the first place, there wasn\u2019t sufficient evidence to support the allegation; or, you can show that your behaviour has changed since the sanctions were imposed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For ICC judges and prosecutors, they could presumably also apply to the U.S. to have their designation removed. They could argue that the underlying basis for the sanctions is not supported by the evidence, that the prosecutorial and judicial acts were not an \u2018extraordinary threat\u2019 to U.S. national security interests and were not politically motivated or selective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The second option is to show how they\u2019ve changed their behaviour. That\u2019s more difficult for the judges, because they\u2019re very unlikely to reverse the decisions that they\u2019ve made on Israel\u2026 that would effectively demonstrate that they are not independent. It would almost prove the point of the U.S., but the other way around. So that\u2019s not a realistic option for them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Failing that, they may be able to lodge an appeal through the U.S. courts. But the courts give the U.S. government a lot of leeway. So I\u2019m not sure how successful either of these avenues would be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The United States is using the threat of sanctions to pressure Rwanda into withdrawing its support for the M23 (pictured here in Goma in February 2025), an armed rebel group that controls part of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Photo: \u00a9 Alexis Huguet \/ AFP<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n \nI don\u2019t think there\u2019s any need to amend the Magnitsky Act. It has a huge amount of discretion built into it already. So different regimes will use it in different ways.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Would you say that the Trump\u2019s administration move against ICC judges to some extent has changed the credibility of the U.S. sanctions regime? Could human rights lawyers like you keep using it in the future and ignore the way it has been used against themselves by the same government? Can you be blind to its abuse and use it when it goes your way? And finally, will there be a need to amend the Magnitsky Act once the Trump era is over? <\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Well, firstly, I don\u2019t think there\u2019s any need to amend the Magnitsky Act. It has a huge amount of discretion built into it already. So different regimes will use it in different ways. I think it\u2019s relatively normal to expect a shift in foreign policy between different administrations in the U.S. And with that shift in foreign policy, there will be a shift in the targets, because the Magnitsky Act is about targeting those who are considered to be working against U.S. national interests, U.S. security interests. And that will change according to the administration and their priorities. So there\u2019s no need to amend the Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In terms of whether human rights lawyers should boycott using the Global Magnitsky, obviously that\u2019s a question for every individual lawyer. But there are only so many options available for human rights lawyers to make a difference. And if they can keep using the sanctions regimes to target the bad guys and make a positive difference in poor countries where victims are still suffering, then it\u2019ll be difficult to give up that option. There are so few options available. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yes, the U.S. has shifted its emphasis. But there still is an overlap between what human rights lawyers want to achieve, and what the administration wants to achieve. Take the example of Rwanda: many people working on the DRC want to see Rwanda withdraw from the Congo, because the M23 are committing horrendous acts in Eastern DRC. So to put pressure on Rwanda to withdraw its support and influence on M23 is very welcome. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The same goes for Iran [This interview was recorded prior to the armed attack of the US against Iran<\/em>]. There\u2019s a lot of convergence of interest between human rights activists, both on the ground in Iran and abroad, with the Trump administration\u2019s approach to influencing the Iranian regime. So, it\u2019s not that the Trump administration doesn\u2019t do anything that\u2019s supported by human rights lawyers. It\u2019s just that there is a different emphasis, and there are very obvious examples when it acts in a way that is contrary to what\u2019s generally favoured by international human rights lawyers. <\/p>\n\n\n
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<\/div><\/a>\r\n\t\t\t![\"Richard](\"https:\/\/www.justiceinfo.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/Richard-Rogers.jpg\")
RICHARD J. ROGERS<\/strong><\/p>\n