El Obeid is also a stark reminder that the responsibilities for this crisis extend beyond Sudanese borders. \u201cWithout the backing of the UAE [United Arab Emirates], we would not have seen so many atrocities,\u201d says Mutasim Ali of the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, an international NGO. The RSF alone would not have the capacity to target civilian infrastructures with highly sophisticated drones like it is doing now in the siege of El Obeid, he explains. \u201cOnly States can acquire those. That is part of the reason why we believe that without holding the UAE to account we will not end this.\u201d Together with others, he last month sent a communication to the International Criminal Court (ICC)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In January 2025, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan promised before the UN Security Council that he would file requests for arrest warrants in relation to abuses committed in Darfur since 2023. Darfur is the only region of Sudan falling within the Court\u2019s jurisdiction, after the Security Council referred it to the Court in 2005. But according to an investigation by Middle East Eye published in early July, such requests were apparently never submitted \u2013 meaning that a pre-trial chamber should have \u201cordered\u201d the Office of the Prosecutor to explain the delay. On July 15, Deputy ICC Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan assured the UN Security Council that her office \u201chad now made significant progress\u201d in the investigation into crimes committed in El Fasher in 2025 and Al Geneina in 2023, amongst other places. She spoke of \u201cconcrete progress\u201d in the investigation targeting \u201cthose who carry out these attacks, those who plan them, and those who support the commission of atrocities from afar and believe they can benefit from impunity\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is against this backdrop that three initiatives were launched last month. Within a few weeks, two communications were submitted to the ICC Prosecutor\u2019s Office, whilst a complaint alleging crimes against humanity and war crimes was filed on the basis of universal jurisdiction<\/a> in Nairobi, Kenya. What they have in common is that they do not merely target soldiers on the ground but seek to trace the chain of responsibility back to those who, from abroad, are alleged to have made these crimes possible by supplying the RSF with weapons, military equipment and mercenaries, or by supporting the SAF with drones, explosives and logistical support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whilst these initiatives are unlikely to lead to actual prosecutions in the short term, they nevertheless help to inform ongoing investigations and maintain judicial and political pressure on those who, from abroad, are fuelling the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On June 16, an initial complaint was lodged with the ICC by seven Sudanese nationals, all from El Fasher and Umm Kaddada in North Darfur. In it, they denounce the abuses they claim to have suffered or witnessed in RSF attacks during the siege of El Fasher between April 2024 and October 2025 \u2013 including executions, acts of torture, sexual violence and forced displacement. These acts may constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes, explains their lawyer, \u00c9lise Le Gall. She says the complaint \u201calso explores the issue of genocide\u201d, which has already been raised by several United Nations<\/a> mechanisms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This submission aims to \u201csupport the work currently being carried out\u201d by the ICC Prosecutor\u2019s Office, according to the lawyer, by providing new evidence that could further its investigations. Above all, however, it aims to persuade investigators to extend their probe to those who, without having participated directly in the abuses, may have helped make them possible from abroad \u2013 especially the United Arab Emirates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For over a year now, new international sanctions, as well as several reports and journalistic investigations<\/a>, have highlighted the role of external actors in the RSF\u2019s operation, funding, recruitment and logistical support, particularly that of Abu Dhabi. \u201cWe have chosen to focus this submission on the United Arab Emirates because the evidence at our disposal points to them as one of the main actors likely to have played a role in the alleged acts,\u201d explains Le Gall. \u201cIn light of this evidence, we believe we have a sufficiently solid factual and legal basis to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n She believes that without the UAE the conflict would never have reached the same scale or intensity. \u201cWhen Rapid Support Forces fighters receive shipments of weapons, drones, howitzers, rocket launchers and air defence systems, they become a formidable fighting force, with disastrous consequences for civilian populations who are deliberately targeted,\u201d says the lawyer. The challenge is to \u201ctrace the chain of responsibility\u201d back to those who made these crimes materially possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The application is based on provisions of the Rome Statute that allow for criminal liability of any person who has facilitated or contributed to the commission of international crimes. If the Office of the Prosecutor were to apply these provisions, it would, according to Le Gall, be \u201cunprecedented\u201d. \u201cTo my knowledge, the ICC has never prosecuted business leaders for their role in providing logistical or financial support in a conflict, nor has it prosecuted foreign political leaders for complicity,\u201d says the lawyer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This strategy targets two groups of people: several RSF fighters directly implicated in the crimes committed in El Fasher and Umm Kaddada \u2013 including \u201cAbu Lulu<\/a>\u201d, whose execution videos have been widely circulated; and several businessmen and political figures linked to the United Arab Emirates, suspected of having helped to bolster the militia\u2019s military capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Among them is Algoney Hamdan Dagalo Musa, Hemedti\u2019s younger brother who is known to be one of the main figures responsible for the RSF\u2019s procurement of arms and military equipment. He is suspected of having used his Dubai-based company Tradive General Trading<\/a> to acquire pick-up trucks which were subsequently converted into vehicles fitted with heavy weapons \u2013 the very same vehicles that are alleged to have been used to deliberately run over civilians during the capture of El Fasher.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the UAE side, the complaint also targets Mohamed Hamdan Alzaabi, owner of the security firm Global Security Services Group (GSSG), which is accused of recruiting Colombian mercenaries to assist the RSF on the ground, notably in El Fasher. In a report published in May 2026, the NGO Human Rights Watch described the company as a \u201csupposedly private\u201d firm which has \u201cclose ties with the authorities of the United Arab Emirates\u201d and \u201cthe ruling family\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, the applicants are calling for an investigation into the role of two of the country\u2019s most senior leaders: Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and Vice-President Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan. \u201cThe information we have gathered suggests that the Emirati authorities may have played a role in setting up a logistics platform that enabled the delivery of arms to the RSF, notably via Chad,\u201d explains Le Gall. \u201cThese findings raise questions about the authorisations that would have been required and the extent of knowledge and responsibility of the authorities concerned.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\t On June 29, the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights followed suit with its own communication<\/a> to the ICC on Sudan. The Canada-based NGO, together with a broad coalition of legal and investigative experts and civil society organisations, asked the Court to issue arrest warrants against senior officials and businesspeople in the UAE and Sudan\u2019s neighbours, such as Chad, Libya and Somalia, for \u201caiding and abetting\u201d crimes committed by the RSF in Darfur. But it did not stop there. It also pointed to the \u201cconduct of individuals in Egypt, Turkey, and Iran in providing arms and military support to the SAF\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWe know from the body of evidence that the UAE is the primary actor here,\u201d says Ali. \u201cBut for us, what is really important is to cover the involvement of external actors more broadly. As soon as we believe that there is enough evidence to implicate other countries, we say so.\u201d He explains that many of the indiscriminate air and drone strikes by the SAF were committed using Iranian and Turkish drones, and that Egypt has been a \u201ckey ally\u201d of the SAF.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regarding the evidence, Ali\u2019s colleague Yonah Diamond would say only that it is based on an internal investigation with \u201cconfidential sources\u201d and the outside work of OSINT investigators who verified data like shipments and flight tracking. Besides supplying arms and mercenaries, their investigation<\/a> found that the UAE has also financed the construction of airports in Chad and Ethiopia and training camps in other countries to \u201chouse drones used in the conflict and as transit hubs for RSF weapons\u201d. As for the SAF, it states that \u201cEgypt has provided drones, explosives, intelligence and logistical support to the SAF, as a means of accessing Sudan\u2019s gold trade, among other geopolitical motives\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ali says they looked at high-level senior officials and corporate executives involved in sending \u201carms shipments with knowledge that these shipments are going to the perpetrators to commit atrocities\u201d. He says that \u201cthe idea here is to put them on notice without even naming them\u201d and demand that the ICC Prosecutor \u201clooks at foreign actors\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But given the international justice deadlock on Sudan, another avenue is also being explored. On June 9, three international organisations including Legal Action Worldwide (LAW) and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies filed a complaint with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in Nairobi, Kenya, on the basis of universal jurisdiction. It was brought on behalf of 12 presumed victims, who are calling for a probe into crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed between April 2023 and March 2025 in Khartoum and the surrounding area \u2013 that is, outside the ICC\u2019s jurisdiction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to Antonia Mulvey, director of LAW, these individuals were all unlawfully imprisoned \u201cat one time or another\u201d in facilities controlled by the RSF. During their detention, \u201cthey were tortured, subjected to sexual violence \u2013 including rape and sexual slavery \u2013 and other forms of persecution. They were also forced to witness the execution of members of their families\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For the organisations behind the complaint, this is a first: never before have proceedings been initiated in Kenya under the principle of universal jurisdiction for international crimes committed abroad. The move is based on the International Crimes Act<\/a> of 2008, which allows the judicial authorities to prosecute any person suspected of having participated in genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes \u201cin Kenya or elsewhere\u201d, provided there is a connecting factor with the country \u2013 such as the alleged perpetrator having Kenyan citizenship or their presence on Kenyan territory after the offences were committed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The evidence presented must now convince the prosecutor that several of the individuals targeted have sufficiently close ties to Kenya to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by Kenyan courts. In total, Mulvey explains, the complaint targets ten RSF commanders \u201cof intermediate to senior rank\u201d, suspected of maintaining \u201cpolitical and financial links\u201d with Kenya. Some are even said to hold Kenyan nationality, \u201cwhich allows them to move freely both within and outside the country\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whilst the identities of the individuals concerned remain confidential, these allegations echo several recent revelations. In February 2026, the leak of an internal immigration service document \u2013 the authenticity of which has never been acknowledged by the authorities \u2013 revealed the names of several Sudanese nationals among the holders of Kenyan passports. At the same time, an update<\/a> to the US sanctions notice targeting Algoney Hamdan Dagalo Musa appeared to confirm one such case, as the US Treasury Department stated that Hemedti\u2019s younger brother also holds a Kenyan passport\u2026 and an Emirati identity card.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This information sparked widespread outrage across the country. The former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, David Maraga<\/a>, has called for an investigation, suggesting that the \u201cwarlord\u201d may have obtained this document \u201cirregularly\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But the passport affair is not the only factor fuelling suspicions. In June 2025, an investigation<\/a> by Bellingcat and the Daily Nation identified, in a warehouse said to have belonged to the RSF in Khartoum, crates of ammunition with markings indicating they were destined for Kenya. Furthermore, it was in Nairobi that the militia in February 2025 signed the charter<\/a> establishing its parallel government, prompting the recall of the Sudanese ambassador and a diplomatic crisis between the two countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Paradoxically, the links that the organisations cite to establish the jurisdiction of the Kenyan authorities are also what make this case sensitive. Will the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions launch an investigation into allegations involving officials who are said to have political, financial or administrative ties with Kenya? \u201cWhen we filed our complaint, we were pleased to note that it had been received favourably and constructively. We were also assured that it would be examined,\u201d says Mulvey, pointing out that the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office is an \u201cindependent body\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThis case is not only an opportunity to test Kenya\u2019s commitment to international justice. It also demonstrates that, although domestic accountability systems and the international community have failed the Sudanese people, the paths to justice are not entirely closed,\u201d says Owiso Owiso, one of the complainants\u2019 lawyers, in a joint statement issued by the three organisations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As for the ICC, it remains to be seen whether the Office of the Prosecutor will act on these communications. Le Gall believes the context is favourable. \u201cThe United Nations\u2019 warnings on Sudan have become so numerous that there is now a wealth of information that must be put to legal use,\u201d she says. In her view, this initiative is also part of a broader trend in international criminal justice, which is gradually shifting its focus away from solely targeting the direct perpetrators of crimes towards also holding accountable those who enable them. \u201cAs in the Lafarge<\/a> and Lundin<\/a> cases, we are seeing a growing trend towards holding economic actors and external political supporters to account.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to Diamond of the Raoul Wallenberg Centre, this is also a \u201ctest case for the ICC to prove its effectiveness on the world stage\u201d and \u201cclose the impunity gap that allows the external actors who are sitting abroad in their capitals to be the ones that are really fuelling and profiting off of these atrocities\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\nTracing the chain of command<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"Egyptian](\"https:\/\/www.justiceinfo.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/Egypt_tanks_@Khaled-Desouki-AFP.jpg\")
Fingers point to Abu Dhabi and Dubai<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Pointing to Sudan government army backers<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
A universal jurisdiction case in Kenya?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"The](\"https:\/\/www.justiceinfo.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/Kenya_David-Maraga_@Simon-Maina-AFP.jpg\")
The Kenyan connection<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\u201cA test case\u201d<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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