At Bangladesh\u2019s International Crimes Tribunal (<\/strong>ICT)<\/a>, by contrast, in absentia<\/em> trials are permitted, and most of those prosecuted before the Tribunal are, in fact, not present in court: of the five completed trials, 43 of 62 accused were tried in absentia<\/em>. And these accused have none of the protections accorded by the STL.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The ICT does require the Tribunal to allocate a lawyer to an accused on the run, but that lawyer has no contact with the accused. They cannot verify facts, identify witnesses, obtain the accused\u2019s own account of events, or test the prosecution\u2019s case against anything the accused might say in response.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The situation is made more problematic still by the Tribunal\u2019s practice of allocating multiple accused to a single court-appointed lawyer. In the trial of Sheikh Hasina<\/a>, the former Prime minister, and Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal, the former Home minister, one court-appointed lawyer represented both of them. And in the trial concerning the killing of Abu Sayeed<\/a>, four court-appointed lawyers represented 24 accused, meaning some lawyers may represent six accused.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These appointments appear to have been made without regard to whether a single lawyer could realistically mount a separate defence for each client given the workload that would be involved if it was done properly \u2013 and, more significantly, without regard to the fact that co-accused in the same case frequently have conflicting interests, making joint representation inappropriate in principle, not merely in practice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that an accused person must \u201chave adequate time \u2026 for the preparation of his defence\u201d. The length of this period will vary from case to case, depending on factors such as the seriousness and the extent of the allegations as well as the complexity of the applicable law. In international criminal law practice, trials typically commence many months after the defence has received full disclosure from the prosecution \u2013 precisely to allow adequate time for preparation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Under section 9(3) of Bangladesh\u2019s original International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973, however, the Tribunal needs to only wait three weeks from the disclosure of the prosecution evidence to the start of the trial. This provision was widely criticised during the Awami League government\u2019s tenure, and after the interim government took office in August 2024, this period was extended<\/a> \u2013 but only from three to six weeks. However in a further amendment in 2025, it was amended back to three weeks<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In practice, Bangladesh\u2019s current tribunals are starting many trials after more than the statutory minimum, but barely eight weeks after the defence has been provided with the evidence. So, in relation to the prosecution of Bangladesh\u2019s Prime minister and Home minister, which involved the most serious allegations of crimes and deaths throughout the country, the formal charge was submitted to the court on June 1, 2025, with the court-appointed defence lawyer saying that he received the evidence on June 25. The trial started just five weeks later on August 3, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the Abu Sayeed trial, the formal charge was submitted on June 30, 2025 with the trial starting a few days short of two months later on August 28, 2025. The judgement<\/a>, interestingly, specifically comments that \u201cadequate opportunity was afforded to the accused persons for consultation with counsel, preparation of defence and meaningful participation in the proceedings, thereby preserving the integrity of the defence process\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Given the seriousness of the allegations \u2013 involving alleged responsibility for multiple deaths \u2013 and given that most defence lawyers had no experience of international criminal law, with some having to defend multiple clients simultaneously, defence lawyers have found this period far too short. \u201cEight weeks\u2019 time was not enough for preparation as the documents of the case materials was so voluminous,\u201d said Aizul Rahman Dula, one of the lawyers instructed by an accused in the Abu Sayeed case.<\/p>\n\n\n\t ICT trials proceed with prosecution witnesses giving testimony in court, followed by cross-examination by defence lawyers. Rule number 53(2) of the Rules of procedure, however, states that \u201ccross-examination shall be strictly limited to the subject matter of the examination-in-chief of a witness\u201d. During the Awami League government period, Tribunal judges interpreted this provision in a way that prevented defence lawyers from cross-examining witnesses about any contradictions between the written statements they had given to investigating officers and the testimony these same witnesses gave in court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This meant that defence lawyers were denied one of the basic tools of cross-examination \u2013 testing a witness\u2019s credibility and reliability by exposing inconsistencies between their prior and current accounts \u2013 leaving the substance of a witness\u2019s courtroom testimony effectively immune from any challenge, however much it diverged from what they had told investigators. Such cross-examination is allowed in normal trials under Bangladesh\u2019s Evidence Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although the problems raised by this ICT rule were noted at the time, it was not amended when the interim government came to power, and the current Tribunal judges have been interpreting it in the same manner as during Sheikh Hasina\u2019s regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As a result, defence lawyers have not been able to question prosecution witnesses about excerpts of their written Investigation Officer statements that are duplicated word for word in other witness statements. These lawyers were therefore unable to raise questions about impartiality of the investigation or connivance of witnesses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example in the prosecution of the politician Hasanul Haque Inu<\/a>, who was recently convicted of three charges of crimes against humanity, the statements of four witnesses who testified state almost word for word that: \u201cDuring the movement, at various times, accused Hasanul Haq Inu, through statements made on various domestic and foreign media outlets such as Mirror Now, News24, and RTV, in order to suppress the movement and divert it in different directions, gave incitement-laden statements labelling the movement\u2019s protesters as jihadis, terrorists, and communal elements, in order to use force to suppress the movement.\u201d Four witnesses used the exact wording and sentences to accuse the politician. However, his defence counsel could not raise this issue with the witnesses during their cross-examination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Judicial notice is an established legal principle, used by international criminal tribunals, to allow judges to accept certain facts or legal matters as established without requiring the parties to submit formal proof. The principle applies at the ICT, but the ICT Act has significantly broadened its scope to allow the Tribunal to take judicial notice of governmental documents and \u2013 most significantly \u2013 \u201creports of the United Nations\u201d. This is particularly relevant to ongoing trials as, in February 2025, the UN office of the High Commission of Human Rights published a fact-finding report<\/a> on \u201cHuman Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In its recent judgment of April 2026 concerning the killing of filmmaker Abu Sayeed, which involved 30 people accused of crimes against humanity, the Tribunal stated that it had taken judicial notice of the UN\u2019s fact-finding report to conclude \u201cthat the death of Abu Sayeed was caused by shock and haemorrhage resulting from multiple ante-mortem injuries, including penetrative injuries consistent with firearm discharge\u201d. This was a matter disputed by defence lawyers, but because the Tribunal had taken judicial notice of the report, their arguments were in effect discounted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In absentia<\/em> proceedings without safeguards, compressed preparation time for lawyers, overloaded lawyers defending multiple clients, sometimes with conflicting interests, a restrictive approach to cross-examination that shields witness statements from scrutiny \u2013 even where duplication is apparent \u2013, and an expanded use of judicial notice that curtails the testing of contested evidence: taken together, these features of the trial process weaken the basic guarantees that fair trial standards are designed to protect, particularly in cases carrying findings of the gravest criminal responsibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The issues set out above are far from a comprehensive account of due process concerns; others include the Tribunal\u2019s refusal to summon defence witnesses, and the sheer speed of the trials themselves. The Tribunal consistently claims that the ICT Act, its rules of procedure, and day-to-day practice comply with international standards. In practice, it appears far from the case, often failing to meet even domestic standards, and risking the credibility of the ICT\u2019s record as a whole.<\/p>\n\n\nHardly two months to prepare a trial<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
No witness cross-examination<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Judicial notice versus formal evidence<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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