Where are we now?<\/h4>\n
At the root of the conflict is a political contest for power between President Salva Kiir and his rival, former vice president Riek Machar.<\/p>\n
After two years of civil war, Machar arrived in Juba in April to cement a shaky peace agreement that gave his opposition SPLA-IO a stake in a government of national unity. But that deal expired in five days of fighting in July, which routed Machar\u2019s small protection force.<\/p>\n
Late last month, Machar announced from Khartoum that he would fight on<\/span><\/u><\/a>. He was joined in rebellion by veteran dissident Lam Akol, who launched<\/span><\/u><\/a> his own National Democratic Movement to battle the government.<\/p>\n So far so predictable. South Sudan is a country held to ransom by what analyst Majak D\u2019Agoot refers to as the \u201cgun class\u201d<\/span><\/u><\/a> - men like Kiir and Machar, \u201csectarian warlords\u201d that have historically used violence, channelled through appeals to ethnic nationalism, to \u201chijack\u201d the state for \u201cpersonal gain\u201d.<\/p>\n It\u2019s essentially a zero-sum game for who will be \u201cking of the hill in Juba\u201d, says conflict researcher Alan Boswell. So far, it\u2019s a contest that Kiir appears to be winning. He has moved quickly to sideline Machar, with former SPLA-IO chief negotiator, Taban Deng Gai<\/span><\/u><\/a>, sworn in as vice president.<\/p>\n The government\u2019s intention is for Taban to woo over as many SPLA-IO commanders as possible, and to present him to the outside world as a credible alternative to Machar. To that end he recently visited New York and hobnobbed with officials in the UN and Western governments.<\/p>\n At home, the government maintains the idea there is still a government of national unity, based on the Addis Ababa peace agreement, an exhausting and frustrating mediation effort by the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).<\/p>\n Is the international community turning it's back?\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Hannah McNeish\/IRIN<\/em><\/p>\n \u201cWhat I hear from government is a determination to move forward with implementation of the peace process,\u201d said a Juba-based analyst who asked not to be named. \u201cYou go to meetings and workshops where people have name tags that still read TGoNU [Transitional Government of National Unity].\u201d<\/p>\n In building up Taban, the government is presenting the international community with a dilemma. Donors have to decide whether \u201cwe work with what we have, which is Taban, versus trying to ease Machar back into the peace process,\u201d says Rashid Abdi of the International Crisis Group.<\/p>\n How acute the choice is will depend to an extent on what Machar does next. Khartoum, against which Kiir and the SPLA fought a bitter war to gain independence in 2011, has long meddled in the south \u2013 backing a rebellion by Machar against the SPLA in 1991 for one.<\/p>\n But Abdi believes the strategic calculation is changing. Through force of habit Khartoum may maintain an interest in Machar, but warming relations with Juba, and its main backer Uganda, means it would not be in Sudan\u2019s long-term interests to arm and support him.<\/p>\n There is also diplomatic pressure to relocate Machar to South Africa, or anywhere else that does not share a border with South Sudan. With his aura already diminished, \u201cIf he goes to South Africa that will be the end of him,\u201d says analyst Jok Madut Jok of the Sudd Institute.<\/p>\n He therefore wouldn\u2019t be surprised if Machar manages to slip back into South Sudan: \u201cIf he can get into Upper Nile he will be a real player, and we\u2019ll be back to full-blown civil war.\u201d<\/p>\n Ethnicity is often used as shorthand to explain South Sudan\u2019s conflict and the atrocities committed against civilians by both sides. But the trigger for the civil war in 2013 was essentially a political dispute, based on internal SPLM opposition to Kiir that was drawn from multiple sources and ethnicities.<\/p>\n Kiir and Machar have since successfully mobilized key segments of their respective Dinka and Nuer communities, the country\u2019s two largest groups. But while Kiir is seen by his opponents as promoting narrow ethnic interests, backed by the conservative Dinka Council of Elders<\/span><\/u><\/a>, there is also resentment among some Dinka towards his clan, who are seen as especially favoured.<\/p>\n Neither are the Nuer monolithic. There are senior Nuer who have remained loyal to the SPLA, especially from northern Unity state. Broad ethnic labels tend to obscure local community dynamics.<\/p>\n Abdi believes the cardinal sin of the IGAD agreement was to view the struggle solely as a contest between Kiir and Machar. It was a narrow rather than a universal deal, ignoring the demands of other ethnic groups and contestants for power that predate the peace process.<\/p>\n Those \u201ccentrifugal forces\u201d are going to accelerate \u201cthe longer [a credible] peace process stays in the freezer,\u201d says Abdi.<\/p>\n \u201cI think you have two different wars going on in South Sudan right now,\u201d notes Boswell. \u201cYou have a fight between Kiir and Machar\u2019s coalitions over who will be king. But there are a bunch of smaller groups in South Sudan who are waging a war against the kingdom itself.\u201d<\/p>\n Even though some groups in Equatoria<\/span><\/u><\/a> have teamed up with SPLA-IO, they are all opposed to the hegemony of both sides. \u201cThey want a structure that\u2019s more like a political union, a lot of smaller hills rather than one big one,\u201d explains Boswell.<\/p>\n Refugees have poured into Uganda and Ethiopia since July clashes.<\/span><\/p>\n There are many other groups across the country\u00a0like the Cobra Faction<\/span><\/u><\/a>, which draws support from among the Murle in Greater Upper Nile. While former leader David Yau Yau is sticking with the government, the Cobras have joined \u201cthe struggle against the authoritarian, tribalistic regime in Juba\u201d.<\/p>\n The government\u2019s approach in the past was to buy off these community militia, a strategy of co-option known as the \u201cbig tent\u201d. But oil-dependent South Sudan is broke, and with carrots limited, the government has turned enthusiastically to the stick.<\/p>\n Wau, South Sudan\u2019s second largest city, has felt the sting\u00a0of\u00a0retribution. It was purged by the army<\/span><\/u><\/a>, allegedly on the grounds the Fertit people were supporting SPLA-IO. Human rights groups reported mass graves, and the UN estimated 125,000 people were made homeless.<\/p>\n Overall, more than one million<\/span><\/u><\/a> South Sudanese are now refugees in the region, with about 174,000 fleeing since the beginning of July.\u00a0 UNHCR\u2019s figures jumped sharply in late September.<\/p>\n People escaping the violence in Equatoria and crossing into Uganda speak of villages being attacked and looted, women sexually abused, and young boys conscripted. \u201cYou can feel something terrible looming on the horizon, an enormous pall,\u201d says the analyst in Juba.<\/p>\n \u201cThe best scenario is an impossible one,\u201d says Jok. \u201cIt\u2019s to get Machar and Kiir to retire from politics, to be replaced by a caretaker technocratic government until elections.\u201d<\/p>\n There are equally few diplomatic options. For a start, the Addis Ababa process is deeply discredited. \u201cIGAD is in complete disarray. Many people no longer believe there is a cogent regional strategy to find a solution,\u201d notes Abdi of the ICG.<\/p>\n The UN\u2019s response to the July violence, in which its peacekeepers failed to intervene <\/span><\/u><\/a>convincingly to save civilian lives, has been to talk tough about an additional Regional Protection Force.<\/p>\n IGAD countries may provide some of the troops (Zimbabwe and Egypt have also volunteered), but as it wants the UN to pay for the intervention, the proposed 4,000 RPF soldiers would fall under a discredited UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) command structure.<\/p>\n Bentiu IDP camp\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Andrew Green\/IRIN<\/em><\/p>\n \u00a0The RPF has the \u201cpacification\u201d of Juba as part of its mandate. But the government has made it clear it will not accept any force that could offer any real interference, and the fact its army has shown no compunction about killing UN peacekeepers<\/span><\/u><\/a>, this is likely to provide food for thought for any potential troop contributors.<\/p>\n South Sudan is such a mess that there have been calls by, among others, former US special envoy Princeton Lyman<\/span><\/u><\/a>, and African academic Mahmood Mamdani<\/span><\/u><\/a>, that the country be placed under some kind of trusteeship for 10 to 15 years.<\/p>\n It\u2019s of course a non-starter. The clock can\u2019t be put back, and there is no support for the proposal in the African Union.<\/p>\n \u201cMamdani has taken progressive positions on most issues, so this is more a symptom of despair rather than anything else,\u201d says Abdi.<\/p>\n \u201cA trusteeship of 10 to 15 years is more than a regime change policy, it\u2019s like \u2018we\u2019re really messed up\u2019,\u201d adds Boswell.<\/p>\n The solution has to come from South Sudanese, says Jok. His best-case scenario is that Kiir gives Taban enough space to play a legitimate role, allowing him to put a brake on the excesses of the army, and build a constituency among the opposition that bleeds support away from Machar.<\/p>\n But Boswell has a more pessimistic take. He believes the government will pursue a security solution that will intimidate and coopt communities. But he likens the outcome to a giant Ponzi scheme, in which its political base of support only gets narrower.<\/p>\n \u201cThe government is winning the war militarily, but the big question is what happens if the Ponzi scheme collapses, swallowed up by the political grievances it\u2019s generating?\u201d<\/p>\n South Sudan, already poor and underdeveloped, is being made poorer still. It's people that have lived through decades of civil war are enduring yet more violence. \"There are no winners in any of this,\" says the Juba-based analyst.<\/p>\nMore of the same?<\/h4>\n
<\/p>\n
Is Machar finished?<\/h4>\n
Power to (my) people?<\/h4>\n
South Sudan refugees<\/span><\/h4>\n
Stick or carrot?<\/h4>\n
How can disaster be averted?<\/h4>\n
<\/p>\n
Start again?<\/h4>\n