{"id":42052,"date":"2019-07-30T08:10:36","date_gmt":"2019-07-30T06:10:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.justiceinfo.net\/42052-colombia-transitional-justice-is-caught-up-in-politics.html"},"modified":"2019-07-30T08:10:36","modified_gmt":"2019-07-30T06:10:36","slug":"colombia-transitional-justice-is-caught-up-in-politics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.justiceinfo.net\/en\/42052-colombia-transitional-justice-is-caught-up-in-politics.html","title":{"rendered":"In Colombia, transitional justice is caught up in politics"},"content":{"rendered":"

One year after he came into office, Colombia\u2019s president Iv\u00e1n Duque has failed to directly modify a central institution of the transitional justice process, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, known as JEP. But the legal offensive continues, as an electoral strategy. While the JEP is struggling to function properly and build legitimacy. <\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Colombian President Iv\u00e1n Duque is nearing his first anniversary in office, unable so far to keep his campaign promise of introducing significant amendments to the 2016 peace agreement with the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).<\/p>\n

His attempts to modify the accord and especially its transitional justice system have so far resulted in a series of congressional and legal setbacks that have undermined his political leadership while creating uncertainty among former combatants and rural communities expecting a peace dividend.<\/p>\n

They have, however, also proven costly to Colombia\u2019s new special peace tribunal. Caught in the middle of political partisanship and court challenges, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace \u2013 or JEP, as it is locally known \u2013 has been unable to properly function and begin showing results in its mission to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of war crimes committed during the country\u2019s 52-year-long armed conflict.<\/p>\n

The government\u2019s will to undermine transitional justice<\/h3>\n

Duque, a former lawmaker and political heir to former president Alvaro Uribe, has vowed to implement the peace deal, while at the same time pledging to introduce modifications that will make it more palatable to the 50.2% of Colombians who rejected the original deal in a 2016 plebiscite.<\/p>\n

His government has already begun planning some of these changes, including once again prioritising the aerial spraying of illicit coca crops with glyphosate (a strategy that former President Juan Manuel Santos had suspended on account of concerns over its impact on public health and the environment) and returning to Uribe\u2019s narrative that Colombia never suffered an internal armed conflict but a terrorist threat.<\/p>\n

The brunt of his criticisms, however, have been aimed at the transitional justice. \u201cWe want a peace that genuinely guarantees truth, justice, reparation and non-recurrence,\u201d he has stated<\/a> repeatedly, referring to the four rights of Colombia\u2019s 8.8 million victims that the peace accord seeks to satisfy.<\/p>\n

Duque\u2019s most ambitious wager was soundly defeated in Congress and questioned by the country\u2019s top court over the past three months.<\/p>\n

In March, President Duque wielded his veto power and presented six objections to a law governing the operation of Colombia\u2019s JEP, even though the bill had already been approved in Congress and had been reviewed by the Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n

One of his suggested amendments, that lawmakers revise the transitional justice system\u2019s mission to prosecute only those most responsible for war crimes, struck at the heart of the peace deal.<\/p>\n

The logic of the JEP model<\/h3>\n

The reason was that Colombia\u2019s innovative transitional justice system, instead of privileging some victims\u2019 rights over others, chose to try to satisfy all of them. Thanks to this formula, former FARC commanders \u2013 as well as military who committed war crimes \u2013 may receive more lenient sentences for serious and representative crimes, such as murder and kidnapping, if \u2013 and only if \u2013 they meet three conditions: acknowledging their responsibility, telling the truth, and personally helping redress victims. With this model, Colombia seeks to fulfil its legal obligations as well as guarantee victims\u2019 rights.<\/p>\n

However, it can only work if the JEP is allowed to concentrate its efforts on those responsible of the most serious crimes, in practice choosing not to prosecute a number of other cases and persons. The reasoning behind the idea of introducing selection criteria is to regulate prosecutorial discretion and to avoid the special tribunal from collapsing on account of the gigantic legacy of atrocities left by half a century of violence.<\/p>\n

Duque\u2019s first attempt falls flat<\/h3>\n

Duque\u2019s \u00a0proposed modifications \u2013 which he claimed<\/a> would \u201cimprove\u201d the peace deal \u2013 were met with scepticism in Colombia\u2019s Congress, where his party the Democratic Centre, led by Uribe, does not hold a majority.<\/p>\n

The lower house overwhelmingly rejected his suggested changes in a 110-44 vote in April, dealing the government a hefty defeat and proving that the political parties that had backed former president Santos\u2019s agreement were still inclined to defend it. Three weeks later there was a similar outcome in the upper house, where a defeat by one vote effectively buried Duque\u2019s objections.<\/p>\n

The Constitutional Court upheld Congress\u2019s decision, something that didn\u2019t come as a surprise given that it had already considered all of the bill\u2019s provisions to be constitutional. In the end, Duque signed<\/a> it in June, amid a general feeling that the country had been embroiled in five months of fruitless political bickering.<\/p>\n

Duque\u2019s back-up plan<\/h3>\n

Just as his objections were struck down, Duque\u2019s government submitted two new draft bills in Congress that once again dealt with transitional justice issues.<\/p>\n

This time there was a stark difference: none of the bills seek to modify the peace agreement signed with the FARC, but rather aim to create new legal standards going forward.<\/p>\n

The first project would ban cases of sexual violence against children from ever falling under the jurisdiction of any transitional justice system or receiving more lenient sanctions. The second one would bar three crimes \u2013 drug trafficking, kidnapping and sexual violence \u2013 from ever being considered as politically motivated, making it impossible for any person responsible of them to receive an amnesty or a pardon in the context of a peace negotiation.<\/p>\n

Something else changed: this time the government\u2019s bills stand a good chance of being approved by Congress. Both of them have secured the backing of several political parties who had rejected Duque\u2019s objections and have already cleared half of the debates needed to become law.<\/p>\n

Bills for the future or the past?<\/h3>\n

The effect these two bills would have if they become law is less clear. Since they cannot be applied retroactively, they don\u2019t modify the peace deal or the work of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. To begin with, their spirit is already present in the peace agreement. After the failed plebiscite in October 2016 and ensuing renegotiation with opponents of the peace deal, a second and definitive peace accord included many of the significant changes and clarifications they put forward. One of them was stating explicitly that drug trafficking would be considered an ordinary crime (and thus be excluded from the transitional justice) if there was evidence it had been carried out for personal gain and not to finance the guerrilla. Likewise, the kidnapping of civilians has always been considered a serious crime in Colombia and has therefore never been privy to an amnesty or a pardon.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the peace deal clearly states that any crimes committed by former FARC rebels after December 2016 shall not be investigated by the JEP but by the ordinary justice system, and in no case will warrant any special criminal treatment.<\/p>\n

These are things Duque knows as a lawyer and former senator. The President was in fact one of those renegotiating the peace deal on behalf of the \u2018No\u2019 camp, as were his Vice-President Marta Luc\u00eda Ram\u00edrez, his Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos Holmes Trujillo, his national security advisor Rafael Guar\u00edn, peace commissioner Miguel Ceballos, and Duque\u2019s political godfather Alvaro Uribe.<\/p>\n

A political gambit<\/h3>\n

The larger question looming on the horizon is what does the Duque administration gain with laws that don\u2019t allow him to modify the peace agreement, neither improving it nor widening the consensus around it. The answer seems to be more about politics than criminal justice.<\/p>\n

Colombia still has one illegal armed group, but negotiations with this guerrilla \u2013 the National Liberation Army (ELN) \u2013 have gone nowhere. Talks in Quito launched in early 2017 stalled under Santos\u2019s administration and were broken off by Duque following the bombing in January of a police academy in Bogota. The government has argued that any eventual peace deal with the ELN would be subject to these new rules.<\/p>\n

However, Duque has shown no interest in holding serious talks with ELN. If there ever was one, in any case the Constitution would need to be amended in order for their crimes to fall under the jurisdiction of the JEP or any new transitional justice system.<\/p>\n

Legal realities aside, these bills allow Duque and his party to play an entirely different ballgame. With local elections of mayors and governors slated for October, passage of these bills in Congress allows them to persuade their voters that they are sticking to their promise of amending the agreement and being tough on crime and impunity.<\/p>\n

They also allow the President and the Democratic Centre to claim they defend the rights of victims of atrocities, who were largely seen as supportive of a peace deal and Santos\u2019 2011 law that recognized them legally. Over the past few months, many lawmakers in Duque\u2019s party have given a voice to the women of the White Rose Corporation, a group of former FARC combatants who claim to have been sexually abused by their superiors and are demanding harsher sentences.<\/p>\n

The JEP at a crossroads<\/h3>\n

Even though polls punished<\/a> Duque and his government over the political fracas surrounding the failed modifications of the peace deal, the transitional justice system has also suffered the political cost of it.<\/p>\n

The signature of the bill governing the Special Jurisdiction for Peace allowed it to begin operating more effectively, but it continues to be the object of political wrangling. The controversy<\/a> over Jesus Santrich, a former FARC commander caught apparently planning a drug operation after the peace deal was signed and sought in extradition by the US, who ended up fleeing justice last month, further eroded the tribunal\u2019s image among ordinary Colombians.<\/p>\n

Simultaneously, a group of victims began gathering the 1,8 million signatures needed to call a referendum in which Colombians would be able to vote on whether to abolish the JEP. Although this outcome is unlikely, Duque\u2019s party is actively supporting<\/a> the idea and using it as a campaign message.<\/p>\n

All of this means that as Duque attempts to find his footing, the special tribunal is also struggling to build the social legitimacy needed to help Colombia heal the wounds left by such a long conflict.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

One year after he came into office, Colombia\u2019s president Iv\u00e1n Duque has failed to directly modify a central institution of the transitional justice process, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, known as JEP. But the legal offensive continues, as an electoral strategy. While the JEP is struggling to function properly and build legitimacy.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":74,"featured_media":65764,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[566],"tags":[],"ji_location":[2177],"class_list":["post-42052","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-national-tribunals","ji_location-colombia"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nIn Colombia, transitional justice is caught up in politics - JusticeInfo.net<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.justiceinfo.net\/en\/42052-colombia-transitional-justice-is-caught-up-in-politics.html\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"In Colombia, transitional justice is caught up in politics\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"One year after he came into office, Colombia\u2019s president Iv\u00e1n Duque has failed to directly modify a central institution of the transitional justice process, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, known as JEP. 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