{"id":45545,"date":"2020-10-01T06:59:55","date_gmt":"2020-10-01T04:59:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.justiceinfo.net\/45545-rwanda-stake-kabuga-trial.html"},"modified":"2020-10-01T06:59:55","modified_gmt":"2020-10-01T04:59:55","slug":"rwanda-stake-kabuga-trial","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.justiceinfo.net\/en\/45545-rwanda-stake-kabuga-trial.html","title":{"rendered":"Rwanda: what\u2019s at stake in the Kabuga trial"},"content":{"rendered":"

What are the consequences of the arrest last May in France of F\u00e9licien Kabuga, considered to be one of the main perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide? French sociologist Andr\u00e9 Guichaoua, a former expert witness for the prosecution at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, describes what is at stake in the trial of the accused, whose transfer to Arusha for trial was confirmed by a French Court on Wednesday 30 September.<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

F\u00e9licien Kabuga, one of the last big genocide suspects wanted for more than twenty years by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and then the residual Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT), was finally arrested<\/a> on May 16 this year in the Paris region of France, where he had been living under a false identity for more than a decade.<\/p>\n

The ICTR indictments<\/a> against him include the most serious crimes of genocide committed in his capacity as president from April 1993 of the Initiative Committee of RTLM radio and president of the National Defence Fund Committee from its creation in April 1994.<\/p>\n

This arrest marks the beginning of a long judicial process. Despite the accused's great age (he is 85), his first court appearance will not take place for several weeks - see below - and the verdict is not expected for at least three years. A conviction is highly likely, but many doubts remain about how much truth will come out in a case already marked by numerous interferences from national and foreign political, judicial and even economic actors.<\/p>\n

The prosecution\u2019s challenges<\/h3>\n

The first challenge in this case concerns Kabuga\u2019s 26 years on the run, many aspects of which remain opaque.<\/p>\n

For Rwandans prosecuted or likely to be wanted by the courts, their choice of host countries depends on the security guarantees offered or that can be bought, and the local support they receive.<\/p>\n

Here we find a number of countries and\/or personalities across the world who had condemned the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) attack of October 1, 1990<\/a> that plunged Rwanda into war. On April 6, 1994, when the attack on the presidential plane left the state and army without a leader, these same countries were awaiting announcement of the agreement on transitional institutions that had just been signed in Dar es Salaam. And they are the same ones that after the military victory of the RPA insurgents and the installation of autocratic rule<\/a>, helped tens of thousands of Rwandans forced into exile. These refugees benefited from the understanding of states and personalities attached to the \"Rwanda of before\".<\/p>\n

General political instability made exile in developing countries, particularly in Africa, uncertain. Similarly, the work of the ICTR and national justice systems gradually dismantled or weakened activist groups.<\/p>\n

Thus choosing to settle in Europe and preferably France, not far from relatives, could paradoxically present the least risks and remain compatible with diminished resources. Indeed, F\u00e9licien Kabuga's last stage in hiding was only possible because his contacts were limited to close family.<\/p>\n

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Recommended reading<\/div>\r\n\t\t\t
\"\"<\/div><\/a>\r\n\t\t\t\r\n\t\t\tF\u00e9licien Kabuga, 23 years on the run... and what\u2019s next?\r\n\t\t<\/a>\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t\t\t<\/div><\/span><\/p>\n

Beyond that, it will be difficult to retrace his steps and networks or identify people who have granted protection and are unlikely to participate spontaneously in the work of truth and justice.<\/p>\n

From allegations to evidence<\/h3>\n

Kabuga\u2019s arrest has prompted the same comments as in 1999 when the indictment was published. There are the same descriptions of him as importer of the machetes arming the genocidaires, the \"richest man in the country,\" of his family ties with the presidential couple, his functions at RTLM, the financing and structuring of the militias and civil self-defence. On these last two points, several trials have concluded with substantiated judgments, but a vast amount of work remains to be done, particularly on the \"financing of the genocide\".<\/p>\n

As of 1995, the ICTR Prosecutor launched various financial investigations to establish the responsibilities of the ministers of finance (E. Ndindabahizi) and planning (A. Ngirabatware), F\u00e9licien Kabuga, his father-in-law, and a few others. For the Office of the Prosecutor, the \"genocidal plot\" must necessarily be reflected in demonstrable economic decisions. Possible evidence included the Galand-Chossudovsky report<\/a>, which invoked the \u201cplanning of the genocide\u201d through Kabuga\u2019s import of exceptional quantities of machetes.<\/p>\n

However, very quickly, ICTR research stumbled on the lack of tangible evidence. The archives from the ministries, including military spending, did not allow for links to the genocide to be established. The \"machete thesis\" proved to be very random. It was almost impossible to establish the direct and personal responsibility of the accused and to prove that the machetes were imported with the intent to kill<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In 1999, the prosecutor redirected her financial investigations to the analysis of accounting and personnel management records of public and private companies. These investigations made it possible to establish the financing mechanisms and networks that supported the structuring and training of the MRND youth movement, the Interahamwe, and that of other parties. The youth movements, created during the establishment of the multi-party system in 1991, boosted the parties\u2019 influence and means of action a lot, strengthening their activist base. With the war, they transformed themselves into militia at the service of the politicians who financed and\/or housed them (like F\u00e9licien Kabuga in Kigali), or even armed them. The investigations also demonstrated the role of public enterprises in the civil war, even if the bulk of transactions were carried out in cash, and so without material evidence.<\/p>\n

In 2001, investigations made significant progress, thanks to access to the bank accounts of individuals and structures suspected of having organized the looting of parastatal companies, and to the budgets of the large technical ministries. Analysis of these documents made it possible to retrace the massive siphoning off of funds from development projects, parastatal establishments and ministries, for personal enrichment and consolidation of nepotistic or partisan networks, as well as the creation of front companies recycling the funds and even transfers abroad when military defeat looked certain.<\/p>\n

Decisive evidence in key cases has been submitted to the ICTR and other foreign jurisdictions. Impunity was such that most transfers were made directly to the personal accounts of dignitaries. As a result, there was great concern in various quarters that genocide-related investigations were uncovering both old and new forms of misappropriation of public or private funds for personal or political purposes.<\/p>\n

In May 2001, the Prosecutor's office tried to extend its investigations to the highest levels of government. A work programme was sent to the Minister of Justice with a list of names and institutions. These requests included operations carried out after the war on the accounts and assets of prominent figures of the old regime who had died, been prosecuted or \"recycled\" by the new authorities.<\/p>\n

But on the day of the request, a wind of panic blew through the banks, especially in Belgium, which made their opposition known at the highest level of the Rwandan state. Investigations were refused on the grounds that they could harm \"national reconciliation\" and the \"reconstruction of the country\" because they would raise the concern of economic groups now shielded from investigation.<\/p>\n

What will happen in the future when prosecution investigators seek such evidence in Rwanda, but also in Belgium, Switzerland, France, and elsewhere? Is it possible to hope that it has been saved?<\/p>\n

Witness credibility<\/h3>\n

A third question concerns the credibility of witnesses.<\/p>\n

Here we should recognize the expertise of Rwandan jurists, capable of organizing intensive sessions with selected witnesses to shape evidence that is difficult to challenge because only the authorities have full access to the field and to individuals.<\/p>\n

But Rwanda has never renounced the use of false witnesses or even the invention of evidence. One wonders whether the National Public Prosecution Authority will dare to call RTLM host Val\u00e9rie Bemeriki as a witness. Sentenced to life imprisonment in Rwanda, she has become the authorities' favourite witness in many proceedings<\/a>, despite ICTR judges\u2019 rejection of her entire testimony in the media trial which they described as \"deplorable<\/a>\".<\/p>\n