“We find ourselves in a geopolitical situation. If we are to choose between the US and Denmark right now, then we choose Denmark, NATO and the EU. The time is not for divisions, but to build on from the community we know and wish for”, the Prime Minister of Greenland Jens-Frederik Nielsen stated in a press meeting held jointly the Prime Minister of Denmark Mette Frederiksen on January 13, 2026.
Faced with the enormous pressure from the US that has repeated its intentions to take over Greenland “one way or the other”, Prime Minister Nielsen chooses his words carefully. Greenland, once a colony of Denmark, has gradually transitioned towards ever-increasing self-government while so far remaining withing the Realm. This has made many speculate what would happen if Greenland pursues independence. However, as Prime Minister Nielsen’s statement indicates, the government’s position on the transition to greater sovereignty is one of gradual, carefully deliberated and well-prepared steps together with the Greenlandic population through a democratic process, in line with the procedures established by the Self-Government Act – not a rash transition into the unknown.
It is into this process of gradual transition, which has a long history, that the US is now intervening.
Greenland’s long push for decolonization
Danish Prime Minister Frederiksen’s statement to some extent mirrors the statements by the two Greenlandic National Councils addressing the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Hague during the case which took place in 1931-33, after Norway had laid claim to a large sector in East Greenland. The Greenlandic politicians back then balanced on a similarly narrow path, on the one hand supporting Denmark vis-á-vis Norway, while at the same time insisting that Greenland ultimately belonged to Greenlanders.
In the inter-war period, the right of colonial powers to keep and govern colonies was accepted in international law. The PCIJ weighed up the respective claims of Denmark and Norway to Greenland as the two recognized parties to the case. Greenland, for the very reason it was a colony, could not be a party to the case or intervene. The Court decided that Denmark had exclusive sovereignty over all of Greenland without considering whether the Inuit had a better claim.
International law as well as the status of Greenland under the Danish Constitution has changed since then. On the conclusion of World War II, the United Nations Charter transformed the international legal position of colonies, requiring colonial powers to govern them in the interests of their populations and to prepare them to move towards self-government. By the 1950s, the General Assembly’s Fourth Committee, tasked with monitoring the governance of colonies, was pushing for colonial powers to loosen the ties and ultimately allow their populations to choose their own paths, with or without the colonial State. Denmark responded by offering “integration” with equal citizenship of Greenlanders and Danes and two seats designated for Greenland in the Danish Parliament. This process has been criticized extensively.
Denmark rolled out welfare policies in Greenland, some of which had been called for by Greenlanders from before World War II. Already in 1914, the Greenlandic priest and politician Mathias Storch had published his novel Singuagtugaĸ (The Dream) presenting a vision of a future Greenland, rooted in Inuit culture and inhabited and administered by modern, self-reliant and self-dependent Greenlanders. He continued to call for decolonization through gradual, well-planned reforms decided by Greenlanders in collaboration with Denmark: keywords that came to resound in Greenlandic political discussions on decolonization for decades to come.
Upon integration in 1953, Greenlanders often felt sidelined in the modernization process when decisions were taken in Copenhagen and implemented quickly with enormous consequences for both individuals, and the Inuit culture and society at large. Despite the constitutional promise of equality, Greenlanders continued to experience discrimination in law, policy and society.
Growing frustrations, including being dragged into the European Economic Community, sparked increasing calls for Home Rule in Greenland (which the Faroe Islands had enjoyed since 1948) coinciding with an international wave of Indigenous rights campaigns in the 1960s and 70s. This resulted in the Home Rule Agreement of 1979 under which Greenland elected its own parliament (Inatsisartut) and government (Naalakkersuisut) for the first time (while maintaining their two seats in the Danish Parliament).
The Act of Greenland Self-Government of 2009
Thirty years later, after a long deliberation process, the Greenlanders would agree the Self-Government Act, approved by referendum in Greenland by over 75%. Not only did this enhance the powers of the Greenlandic Parliament and Government, it set out a pathway for Greenlanders to change their constitutional settlement with Denmark, including by becoming an independent State. In the Preamble, Denmark recognizes that the Greenlanders are “a people pursuant to international law with the right of self-determination”.
Since 2009, discussions on how to take the next steps have been a recurrent theme in Greenlandic politics. The model of a free association has often been discussed, and the assumption has been largely that the partner state would be Denmark.
Greenland’s politicians – as in any healthy democracy – have different opinions on striking the balance between economic stability and constitutional change, as well as on how to improve the economic resilience of the Greenland economy while protecting social and environmental standards. There is, however, a unified view that Greenlanders are a unique People and seek (continued) recognition of their right to make their own decisions in their own time.
This was underlined in a common press statement from all Greenlandic political party leaders on January 9, 2026 stating that “We do not want to become Americans, we do not want to be Danish, we want to be Greenlanders.”
US interventions in the transition
President Donald Trump has repeatedly referred to “national security reasons”, when explaining his annexation ambitions and has so far refused to rule out the use of force despite the fact that the US army has been present in Greenland since World War II.
While Denmark was occupied by Nazi Germany, the US, with the consent of the Danish Ambassador to the US (now without a Danish government to which to report), established bases and located troops around Greenland. Today, only the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) is operational. In 1946, President Harry Truman already made an offer to purchase Denmark, echoing President Andrew Johnson’s similarly rebuffed offer in 1867. A 1951 defense agreement with Denmark gives the Americans broad freedom to operate throughout Greenland to meet its security needs – which is today operationalized through tripartite agreements and diplomacy (US, Denmark and Greenland).
Trump, in a candid interview with the New York Times in the context of the US arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, stated that he is not constrained by international law but only his “own morality, [his] own mind”. Although he partially walked this back, insisting the US’ actions in Venezuela were in fact permissible under international law (as self-defense), the administration’s actions and the failure to submit a formal notification to the UN Security Council as required under the UN Charter, indicates that Trump’s first reply is the better reflection of his views. The withdrawal of the US from dozens of treaty commitments and international fora by Presidential fiat also supports the view that the US does not take international law seriously.
Remedies and Responses
Any use of force to pursue the annexation of Greenland would also be a manifest breach of article 2(4) of the UN Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.
The only exceptions are the cases of “necessary and proportionate” self-defense (article 51) or with a UN Security Council resolution that calls for a military intervention in response to a breach of or threat to peace and security (Chapter VII). Even the most extravagant claims of the US regarding Russian or Chinese interests in the North Atlantic would not satisfy the claim of self-defense as neither Greenland nor Denmark, whose territory it is, are the aggressors; and both Russia and China can and will veto any attempted Security Council resolution.
A resolution of the General Assembly in the coming days or weeks is not unlikely if the US continues to demand “ownership” of Greenland in blatant disregard of the wishes of Greenland’s elected representatives, especially if threats to impose tariffs on countries defending Greenland and Denmark intensify or are realized. However, General Assembly resolutions are not binding and consequently have no enforcement mechanisms.
The US does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Nor does the European Council of Europe (and the European Court of Human Rights) have any competence beyond its member States’ territories (which includes the Kingdom of Denmark, but not the US) (or, in exceptional cases, where they exercise control extraterritorially). The World Trade Organization’s judicial system is also hamstrung by the US’ failure to agree appointments to the appellate body since Trump’s first term in office therefore it cannot give a final decision on the lawfulness of tariffs.
This leaves the European Union which appears poised to pause ratification of the US-EU trade deal (about which many parties were already unhappy) and which is mooting retaliatory tariffs and even implementation of the anti-coercion instrument – the so-called “big bazooka” that permits punitive sanctions on countries trying to influence improperly EU policy. European States have quite different balances of trade with the US as well as varying degrees of political alignment. But the anti-coercion instrument can be triggered by qualified majority and does not require unanimity of all 27 Member States.
A violent annexation of Greenland would almost certainly torpedo NATO in practice, even if not on paper. Some of Trump’s administration may be delighted to see the demise of the 70-year defense alliance but clearer heads may prevail when they consider the medium and longer-term impacts of collapsing the pact.
What has sometimes been missed in media reports is that the general political line in Greenland is that, despite different views on the pace of transition, any radical constitutional change of status should follow the process laid out in the Self-Government Act. This is likely to include broader negotiations with other countries, including the EU, the US, Canada, Iceland and other NATO allies, Indigenous Peoples representatives, and most importantly, ongoing friendly relations with Denmark.
The problem now for the US, with its hyperrealist, short-term approach to international relations, is that it must square an impossible circle. It claims that international law does not restrict its conduct and that it can walk away from any treaty commitments when they are no longer convenient. But at the same, it is asking Greenland, Denmark and their European allies to enter a new treaty regarding the territory. In short, the US is both rejecting the most fundamental principle of international law, pacta sunt servanda (treaties shall be kept) and then asking to be taken seriously as a treaty-partner.
Astrid Nonbo Andersen is Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies. Her principal area of research is truth and reconciliation processes, transitional justice and peace studies, and a particular focus on colonialism in the Nordic countries, Denmark and its former colonies. She recently published the monograph Monumentet: Billeder af Grønland I Danmark gennem 100 år (Gad 2025) with Martine Lind Krebs on the relations between Greenland and Denmark during the past 100 years, which amongst others presents new research on the Greenlandic statements at the Permanent Court of Justice in 1931-33.
© Axel Darri
RACHAEL LRNA JOHNSTONE
Rachael Lorna Johnstone is professor of law at the University of Akureyri and adjunct professor at Ilisimatusarfik (the University of Greenland). Johnstone specializes in Polar law: the governance of the Arctic and the Antarctic under international and domestic law. She has published widely on decolonization and the rights of indigenous people, with particular emphasis on Greenland; governance of extractive industries in the Arctic; international human rights law; international environmental law; state responsibility and due diligence; and Arctic strategies. She is co-editor of the Routledge Handbook of Polar Law (2023).
