Paris, France, March 9, 2026 (MediaConnect) - Press release from ISD / AFP / CASM research project-Monday 09 March 2026.
Pro-Kremlin actors stepping up efforts to interfere in democratic debate across Europe and beyond. This is the conclusion of a series of investigations by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) in collaboration with Agence France-Presse. The 18-month investigation exposed tactics which exploit weak sanction enforcement, new technologies and localised networks to spread disinformation, inflame social tensions and undermine trust in democratic institutions.
FACTSTORY / AFP, Paris, March 9, 2026"The common thread we found through these investigations is adaptability," says Zoe Manzi, Senior Hate and Extremism Analyst at the ISD. "The use of the same strategic playbook that actors are using to launder narratives through intermediaries and proxy outlets, and a distribution system that ensures misleading narratives travel farther than facts."The investigations, spanning six EU countries as well as Sahel nations show how Russian-aligned influence operations have evolved significantly since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Rather than relying on official state media alone, these campaigns increasingly use proxy websites, AI-generated content, bot networks and local influencers to circumvent restrictions and embed Kremlin narratives within domestic information ecosystems.Together, the findings point to a persistent and adaptive threat that continues to reach millions of people despite European sanctions on Russian state media and new regulatory frameworks designed to limit foreign interference.Weaponising the Epstein Files
In one report, the ISD uncovered a network of pro-Kremlin social media accounts pushing the false claim that Russia has been saving Ukrainian children from an international sex-trafficking ring. Moscow has long claimed that Ukraine is at the centre of a child abuse network, but the US government's release of a new tranche of the Epstein files has allowed it to double down.The investigation uncovered posts viewed millions of times on Facebook, X and TikTok pushing the narrative, contradicting accounts of Russia forcibly deporting Ukrainian children since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, which led to an ICC indictment.This is part of a wider pro-Kremlin tactic of "flooding" or filling the information space with information helping bolster Moscow's narrative and sow confusion among populations in Western democracies.Sanctioned media reaching EU audiences
Three years after the European Union banned Russian state media outlets like RT (formerly Russia Today), the ISD found that enforcement of these measures remains inconsistent across EU countries, effectively allowing proscribed outlets to remain accessible and influential.An audit of internet service providers in Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Czechia and Slovakia identified dozens of domains linked to various EU-sanctioned Russian media outlets. Across the three largest ISPs in each country, fewer than a quarter of attempts to access sanctioned content were effectively blocked. "Sanctions are very difficult to enforce in the information space simply because information can be repackaged and repurposed at basically no cost," according to Melanie Smith, ISD Senior Director of Research & Policy, Information Operations. "It's very difficult to ascertain where a piece of information came from, how it was amplified and then where it ended up, which is really where organisations like us come in to try and provide some of that evidence."The gaps in enforcement have real-world consequences. During the German federal election in February 2025 and the Polish presidential election in summer 2025, proxies of sanctioned outlets played a key role in boosting polarising narratives, including the denial of Russian war crimes in Ukraine and false claims about Ukrainian refugees.In Germany, the ISD uncovered a coordinated network of dozens of accounts on X spreading untrue claims about politicians and fabricated terror threats in the run-up to the federal election. The network disseminated videos designed to impersonate reputable media outlets, law enforcement agencies and academics, at times using AI-generated audio and visuals.Russia-aligned actors targeting Poland were found to be exploiting negative sentiment towards Ukrainian refugees ahead of the vote. The investigation identified a campaign involving elements linked to known pro-Kremlin operations.Online, but not only
Beyond elections, the ISD's investigations show how pro-Kremlin narratives are increasingly localised and embedded within domestic communities."We spend a lot of time talking about online and digital influence. We don't spend a lot of time talking about what to do when we see offline activity taking place," says Smith. "We tried to understand how the Kremlin was propping up things like protests and demonstrations, so we were very focused around events."In Italy for example, the ISD found that RT-aligned networks have combined online activity with offline events to bypass EU sanctions on the "transmission or distribution by any means" of banned content. Analysts identified Italian-language networks promoting pro-Russian propaganda films and posters in public spaces across the country.In Czechia, the investigation identified a Czech-language community on X acting as a gateway for Kremlin-aligned propaganda years after official Russian outlets such as Sputnik CZ were banned. "Not surprising" Sahal targeted
The ISD also documented how similar tactics are being deployed outside Europe, notably in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Following the staged withdrawal of French and UN forces between 2022 and 2025, all three countries have turned to Russia for military support."I'm not surprised that we saw the Sahel being targeted by pro-Kremlin narratives," says Manzi. "Russia has been contesting influence in Africa for a while now. What was surprising was the localisation of the campaigns in terms of language, grievances and regional political differences."The ISD's investigation found that pro-Kremlin actors are deploying local influencers, journalists and grassroots activists to promote Russian narratives in local languages, presenting them as authentic domestic perspectives rather than foreign propaganda.A headache for policymakers: "The problem is not going anywhere"
The findings raise serious questions about the effectiveness of current policy responses. Technical, legal and political gaps in the enforcement of sanctions, alongside uneven platform compliance, continue to provide opportunities for foreign information manipulation."I think policymakers should be investing in longer term infrastructure for dealing with this issue. We know the war in Ukraine has been going on for four years now. This problem is not going anywhere anytime soon," says Smith."Tech platforms play a really key strategic role in countering some of this information manipulation. We need consistent content moderation across the false and misleading content in line with their own policies and terms and conditions. But we also need data to be made available to researchers like us so that there can be independent scrutiny of the types of enforcement mechanisms they use."
For more information on the investigations visit https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatches/For press enquiries please contact: media@isdglobal.org
"Exploring the interplay between pro-Kremlin ecosystems and extremist movements in Europe" is a project launched in 2023 by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and CASM Technology LLP, later joined by the international news agency Agence France-Presse (AFP). The current 18-month phase concludes on 31 March 2026.This initiative received funding from the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) programme.
Consultez la version source sur MediaConnect.com : https://mediaconnect.com/isd_investigation_exposes_sophistication_of_russian_interference
ISD / AFP / CASM research project
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