Winter 2014, Southern Sector Detachment, Al-Tadamon District, Damascus.
"Finish them."
With those words, the commander of the National Defense Forces in the southern part of Syria’s capital city, a pro-Assad militia, ended the conversation, pushing a Kalashnikov rifle into Abu al-Layth's hands, al-Layth recalls. The man looked down at the three prisoners bound at his feet.
"I recognized them immediately," he says.
The three men were fighters in the Free Syrian Army, an armed opposition group fighting the Bashar al-Assad regime. Just one year earlier in 2013, they had stormed his home, he says. He and his brother were abducted and held captive for two months after being targeted because of their religious background as Alawites. During their captivity, they were tortured before eventually being released in a prisoner exchange.
When the two brothers returned home, neither was the same person anymore. The younger brother had suffered permanent brain injuries, while Abu al-Layth, an assistant engineer at the state electricity company, was now carrying a weapon in the ranks of the National Defense Forces.
"I didn't think much about it back then," he says. "All I wanted was to stop them from reaching my family, and to take revenge for my brother." He pauses for a moment before adding: "There were many people like me."
Al-Layth says he came to know Amjad Youssef well after joining the National Defense Forces. Youssef was a First Sergeant in the Military Intelligence, Security Branch 227. "We used to meet in Al-Tadamon at a place known as the Security Office," he recalls. "We exchanged information there and received instructions from the sector commander, who in turn received orders from the overall commander of the National Defense Forces attached to the Republican Guard."
According to Al-Layth, Youssef changed after the death of his younger brother in 2013. "After his brother was killed, Amjad was consumed by revenge," al-Layth says. "Nothing ever seemed to satisfy that thirst. Even all the execution orders assigned to him were not enough. He would cry like a child whenever he spoke about his younger brother. In some way, he saw his brother's death as a personal wrong that had to be avenged."
The Tadamon massacre
The Tadamon massacre took place on April 16, 2013, in the Damascus district of Tadamon, an area that was then under the control of Syrian government forces. The massacre remained unknown for nearly nine years until April 2022, when The Guardian published videos showing security personnel and pro-government militiamen executing blindfolded civilians and dumping their bodies into a large pit before setting them on fire. Researchers who later analyzed the footage identified at least 41 victims in the recorded killings, while evidence gathered during the investigation suggested that the videos documented only a small part of a wider pattern of executions carried out in the area. The footage drew international attention and became one of the most widely documented visual records of wartime atrocities committed in Syria. Youssef was identified as the main perpetrator on the basis of the videos.
When asked about the Al-Tadamon massacre, Al-Layth says "that it was just one execution operation" carried out during the war. "There were many others that no one ever learned about" including in al-Joura and an area behind the district's automatic bakery – both locations being in Al-Tadamon district.
Abu al-Mawt, another former member of the National Defense Forces, says he was only 17 years old when he joined the militia in 2013. "People disappearing was a normal part of life in the neighborhood," he recalls. "They would be taken from security checkpoints to the front lines and forced to dig trenches. We called it sukhra”, a form of forced labor in which civilians were compelled to work without pay.
According to Al-Mawt, those taken for sukhra were often civilians seized against their will and sent to work near active combat zones. "The same thing happened to me," he says. "After that, I volunteered for the National Defense Forces to protect myself." He adds that many of those taken for sukhra never returned. "We were told that snipers had killed them."
Then in December 2024 the Assad regime fell.
The arrest of Amjad Youssef
On April 24, 2026, Syria's Interior Ministry announced the arrest of Amjad Youssef. After his arrest, Youssef admitted during questioning that he had carried out the executions documented in the Al-Tadamon massacre footage. He stated he had acted without orders and out of personal revenge for the death of his brother.
Al-Layth rejects that account. "That's not true," he says. "The orders came from the sector commander, acting on instructions from higher-ranking commanders. The goal was to terrorize civilians and drive them away from the opposition." According to him, Youssef's statement was either intended to protect someone higher up the chain of command or was made under pressure. He also claims those selected to carry out executions were carefully chosen. "They picked either extremists, like Najib al-Halabi [one of Yusuf's key partners in the massacre, reportedly killed afterwards], whom I considered mentally unstable, or people like Amjad Youssef, who had personal motives that made them less likely to betray the system and more likely to become implicated in its crimes."
"That's what they wanted to do to me," he says. "They wanted to turn us into criminals driven by our emotions."
Now, more than a decade later, Syria's new authorities say they are pursuing justice for crimes committed during the war. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, they began a broad campaign of arrests targeting former military officers, intelligence officials, and militia members accused of involvement in war crimes and serious human rights violations during the conflict that began in 2011.
Other arrests
Several arrests were reported in connection with the infamous Sednaya prison, long associated with detention, torture and executions. Mohammad Kanjo Hassan, former head of the military field courts that issued rapid rulings outside the ordinary judicial system and became notorious for handing down death sentences to detainees after unfair proceedings, was arrested in December 2024. He is accused of issuing mass death sentences and overseeing executions. Aws Saloum, a former prison guard, was arrested in January 2025 over allegations of torture and killings of detainees. Mohammad Nour al-Din Shalloum, a former surveillance officer, was also arrested in January 2025 and is accused of disabling cameras and participating in abuse and concealment of evidence. In October 2025, Akram Salloum al-Abdullah, a former military police commander at Sednaya, was arrested on allegations linked to executions and handling of bodies.
Arrests also concerned members of pro-government militias and military divisions. Saher al-Naddaf, a militia commander, was arrested in January 2025 over alleged involvement in executions in the field. Bashar Mahfouz, a commander in the 25th Division, was arrested in March 2025 and is accused of leading raids on civilians before later forming an armed group involved in kidnappings and robbery. Shadi Mahmoud, a former intelligence officer from Branch 277, was arrested in March 2025 over alleged coordination of armed operations. Mohammad Jawdat Shahada, also linked to the 25th Division, was arrested in April 2025 on accusations of participating in massacres and abuse of bodies.
Former officers from intelligence agencies were also included in the arrest waves. Atif Najib, former head of Political Security in Daraa, was arrested in January 2025 over allegations of arresting and torturing protesters in 2011. His trial has just opened. Mohammad al-Shaar, former Minister of Interior, was arrested in February 2025 on accusations of overseeing nationwide detention and repression systems. Ibrahim Huweija, former Air Force Intelligence chief, was arrested in March 2025 and is accused of involvement in political assassinations and major security crackdowns. Additional arrests included Qusai Ibrahim in October 2025, Naif Saleh Dargham later that month over military court rulings, and Youssef Suleiman al-Hassan in April 2026 over alleged security operations in coastal regions.
Higher-ranking figures and Air Force officers were also reported among detainees. Salim Iskandar Tarraf, a former Republican Guard commander, was arrested in May 2025. Wassim al-Assad and Nimr Badi al-Assad, both relatives of the former president, were arrested in 2025 on charges linked to armed networks and criminal activity. Riyad Hamdou al-Shahada, former head of Political Security in Damascus, was arrested in July 2025. In May 2026, authorities announced the arrest of Wasel Al-Owaid, former Deputy Chief of Staff, and Jayez Hamoud al-Mousa, former Air Force Chief of Staff.
In parallel, Air Force-related arrests included Abdul Wahab Othman in March 2025, accused of directing aerial bombardments, Suleiman Dioub in March 2026 over militia-linked activity, Ghith Mohammad Shahin in April 2026 over artillery operations, and Ibrahim Mahla, whose arrest was confirmed in May 2026 as part of the same wider campaign.
A debated legal framework
While the arrests have been welcomed by many victims as a long-awaited step toward accountability, they have also raised new debates. Critics point to the still unclear role of the National Commission for Transitional Justice (NCTJ), established by Presidential decree in May 2025, and to continuing debates over how former regime officials should be prosecuted. The ongoing trial of Atif Najib has become one of the first major tests of that process.
In the absence of a comprehensive transitional justice law, Syrian legislation still lacks clear provisions defining crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. Critics also point to laws enacted under the former government that granted members of the security services broad protection from prosecution for crimes committed while carrying out their duties.
Speaking during a lecture in Damascus on 14 June 2026, lawyer and international criminal law specialist Almoutassim al-Kilani argued that the current legal framework may be inadequate for prosecuting such crimes. "Under the laws currently in force, murder offenses, classified as felonies, become time-barred after 10 years, while torture offenses, classified as misdemeanors, become time-barred after 5 years,” he said, noting that offences such as intentional homicide are subject to statutes of limitation under Syrian law, while the events for which Najib is being prosecuted date back to 2011. “This has also raised concerns that perpetrators may escape accountability,” he added
Judicial authorities have defended their approach. Fakhr al-Din al-Aryan, president of the Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus, stated in court that the trial is proceeding under Syrian national law while relying directly on customary international law and international treaties for serious violations. According to the court, the indictment draws on the principle that international crimes should not be subject to limitation periods.
In a legal analysis, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), an NGO, questioned the court's reliance on the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, noting that Syria is not a party to the treaty.
Tensions in the society
In the days following Youssef’s arrest, social media platforms were flooded with discussions about other crimes attributed to former security officials and militia leaders. Among the most widely shared was renewed discussion of the disappearance of Syrian doctor Rania al-Abbasi, her husband and their six daughters, who were arrested in 2013 and never seen again. Online accusations linking Youssef to the case circulated widely, further fueling public anger.
In some areas, demands for accountability seem to have merged with sectarian tensions. Reports emerged of attacks targeting Alawite villages in parts of Homs and the al-Ghab plain, while demonstrations in other cities called for the removal of former regime supporters from public life. In Aleppo, threatening leaflets targeting alleged collaborators circulated in some neighborhoods. In Deir ez-Zor and Idlib, protests denounced what demonstrators described as the rehabilitation of figures associated with the former government, including businessmen and former militia leaders who have recently reappeared in public life.
Others question whether the emerging justice process is designed to address crimes committed by all parties to the conflict, or primarily those attributed to the former government. The debate reflects broader disagreements over how Syria should balance accountability, reconciliation and social stability after more than a decade of war.
For Abu al-Layth, those questions are deeply personal. He recalls standing over the three bound prisoners in Tadamon. "I looked at them and remembered my brother, his daughters, and our burned house," he says. "I felt overwhelming anger." Yet he says he never pulled the trigger. Instead, he handed the rifle back to his commander. "I told him I didn't want to do it. I said I would leave them to the courts." Refusing the order came at a cost. He says he was removed from frontline duties and was no longer trusted by his superiors. After the fall of Assad, he considered surrendering himself to the new authorities, convinced he had never been involved in killings. But after the violence that swept Syria's coast earlier this year, he fled to Lebanon with his family. Watching Youssef's arrest from exile, he says he is not sure what justice will look like. "I used to tell my former colleagues to surrender," he says. "If the leaders are cleared and the blame falls on the lower ranks, many will believe they have nothing left to lose."
This publication was funded by the European Union under the project "Inclusive Justice in Syria: Building Capacity, Centering Victims". Its contents are the sole responsibility of Justice Info and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. Justice Info’s journalists retain full editorial independence over all content.
