Israel exercises control over approximately 7 million Jewish citizens and 7 million Palestinians across the entire territory of Israel/Palestine. Over the decades, a regime has gradually taken shape in which access to land, legal status, and rights is differentiated according to nationality, ethnicity, and geographic location.
As in other historical processes of settler colonialism, such systems tend over time to become increasingly racialised, coercive, and institutionally corrosive. Earlier attempt to combine Jewish statehood with liberal democratic values has gradually given way to a more religious, authoritarian, and illiberal form of Zionism. These ideas now influence a broad spectrum of right-wing political actors, including secular ones, and are increasingly associated with ethnonationalism, illiberal governance, and violence – perhaps an inevitable trajectory from a colonial perspective.
The 37th Israeli government coalition, formed on 29 December 2022 under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (his sixth term), marks one of the most explicitly religious-Zionist governments in Israel’s history, with multiple ministries held by parties supportive of settlement expansion and the consolidation of Jewish sovereignty in the ‘greater land of Israel’.
Yet this development is part of a much longer process. Many religious-Zionist politicians, before entering formal politics, were active within a matrix of colonial grassroots networks, ideological movements, and local municipalities in the West Bank. They are typically educated in Zionist religious schools, then continue their path in a yeshiva [rabbinical school] or in frameworks combining religious studies with military service. After serving in the army, many become involved in activism related to the settlements, through youth movements, advocacy organizations, or municipal administrations established in the West Bank. Some universities also offer specialized programs, such as Ariel University and Bar-Ilan University.
Over time, a complex network has thus taken shape, linking local municipalities, ideological movements, grassroots organizations, schools, pre-military academies, as well as international Zionist organizations and philanthropic foundations. Through these interconnected channels, individuals move from one sphere to another and gain increasing influence within state institutions. This has gradually blurred the boundaries between the state apparatus and the militant structures of religious Zionism, revealing an increasing continuity between the two and contributing to the emergence of a “deep state” dynamic.
The local governance of the West Bank
The Israeli settlement governance system in the West Bank is structured around four big cities (with 226,000 residents), as well as six regional councils and fourteen local councils. Together, they administer municipal services such as education, infrastructure, and local planning for a population of around 530,000 Jewish settlers living across 150 towns and villages, and dozens of ‘illegal outposts’, including 121 new outposts/farms established since October 2023.
The 24 elected mayors and heads of local councils are organized under the umbrella of The Yesha Council, established in 1980. It serves as a powerful political lobby aiming at the: “Application of Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank; reaching one million (Jewish) Israelis living in the West Bank; The development of economic infrastructures; To double the number of tourists from all over the world and all religions and to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.”
The Yesha Council’s website notes that “2025 was a landmark year for Israeli settlements in the West Bank”, with record approvals for tens of thousands of housing units, new pro-sovereignty legislation, and policy changes that accelerated regional development, including a dedicated security grant for local councils and tax benefits for threatened communities. Since the current government took office in 2022, around 69 new settlements have been legalized or established, including the approval of the E1 plan near Ma’ale Adumim, strengthening Israeli territorial continuity and undermining prospects for a Palestinian state. Thus, in the past decade, the settler population has grown by nearly 140,000 people, a 36% increase, with rapid growth in smaller settlements.
Government investments in development per capita are about 74% higher than in Israel within the Green line. Naturally, all ministries are involved. The work plans of various government ministries demonstrate a coordinated and multi-sectoral involvement in settlement-related projects in the West Bank. The Ministry of Construction and Housing explicitly frames settlement expansion as part of its response to the housing crisis, aiming to increase the supply of housing in the West Bank. The Ministry of Environmental Protection similarly plans to strengthen environmental governance in the same areas. The Ministry of Heritage supports preservation and intervention projects in archaeological and heritage sites in the West Bank; the Ministry of Transportation promotes infrastructure development to integrate these roads into national mobility networks; and the Ministry of Tourism seeks to allocate resources in the West Bank “to parts which hold historical and cultural significance for the Jewish people”. In parallel, the Ministry of Communications is advancing infrastructure development, particularly through improving cellular coverage in the West Bank. This includes the establishment of new transmission sites and the deployment of advanced technologies such as 5G.
The role of Regavim
Regavim is an influential organization, founded in 2006 by far-right activists including finance minister Bezalel Smotrich and Yehuda Eliyahu, who currently heads the Settlement Administration in the Defense Ministry. Its declared colonial goals are aiming at preserving Jewish land and natural resources in the West Bank. Alongside this, it engages in parliamentary lobbying, and among other things, it was behind the legal reform aiming at limiting the competence of the High Court of Justice to review legislation and to have political control on the judges’ nomination. Over the years, the organization has received public funds via the State (in 2018, 1 million shekels – about 340,000 dollars) and West Bank regional councils such as Binyamin, as well as through donations (in 2024, almost 2 millions shekels from one US corporation).
It focuses heavily on monitoring Palestinian construction, particularly in Area C, to increase enforcement and punishment against building offenders through land and planning laws. Following sustained advocacy by Regavim, the Ministry of Settlement Affairs and National Missions allocated millions of euros in the last couple of years to “community surveillance” initiatives at the local council level, including drones and patrol units tasked with real-time land monitoring and reporting alleged violations. These units transmit information directly to enforcement authorities at the Civil Administration (headed by Smotrich), that enable demolition of these structures. These actions resulted in 2025 in the demolition of 1,269 Palestinian structures in Area C, hundreds of incidents of settler violence resulting in bodily injury or property damage, and 22 Palestinian communities fully or partially displaced due to settler violence.
After the 2022 elections, a new Civilian Administration was established in the West Bank with the “Settlements Administration”, that encompasses extensive administrative powers, land expropriation, planning and construction enforcement in Area C, land registration and legalization of outposts, as well as infrastructure governance over electricity, water, communications, and roads. On 29 January 2026, Israel’s High Court of Justice, in a decision written by judge Yael Vilner, not only rejected the petition of NGOs challenging this new authority previously under military administration, but it actively informed the government how to make sure that it does not introduce “illegal changes”, i.e. keeping the appearance of an ‘occupation’ and not ‘annexation’.
The One-Million Settlers Plan and annexation of 82 % of the West Bank
Smotrich and the Settlement Administration at the Defense Ministry have presented in September 2025 sovereignty maps, according to which the annexation will be of 82 per cent of the land. Only six Palestinian enclaves are colored yellow and separated from one another (the cities of Hebron, Ramallah, Jericho, Nablus, Tulkarm, and Jenin). It also aims to raise the Jewish population to one million by 2050 while creating “territorial continuity” in the occupied Palestinian West Bank. This clearly indicates that the post-October 2023 period has significantly accelerated settlement expansion policies to an unprecedented extent.
Between February and May 2026, and during the war with Iran, Israel significantly expanded settlement policy and infrastructure in the West Bank. In February, the cabinet broadened law enforcement powers in areas under Palestinian Authority control, enabling demolition and land expropriation linked to settlement expansion, alongside statements calling for further consolidation and even Palestinian “migration”. In March, construction began on a new settlement near Nablus, and the Security Cabinet reportedly approved the establishment of 34 additional settlements (publicly revealed in April). In April, large-scale industrial and housing expansion projects were launched, alongside plans for tens of thousands of new homes and major population growth in the area. At the end of April, the government integrated a national infrastructure coordination system into the Civil Administration to accelerate planning and construction in the West Bank. In early May, approximately €270 million was allocated for roads and infrastructure serving new settlements.
Colonial crimes and the limits of the ICC
On the 17th of May it was communicated by Israel – and denied by the International Criminal Court (ICC) – that arrest warrants were issued under seal against Smotrich and others. These arrest warrants may address the individual criminal responsibility of these persons for apartheid as a crime against humanity, or for settlements as a war crime.
Since the beginning of the Palestine situation before the ICC, including its preliminary examination phase, colonial crimes such as settlements and other crimes associated with the apartheid occupation regime in the West Bank have been central to the scope of the case, even if the attacks on 7 October and the subsequent Israeli retaliation in Gaza have tended to overshadow these crimes.
Colonial crimes are the result of a systemic project involving the de-possession of territory, the displacement and subordination of indigenous populations, and the establishment of political, legal, and economic structures designed to sustain unequal power relations. Practices such as population transfer, segregation, dispossession, and the denial of self-determination may give rise to crimes recognized under international law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. Yet these offenses can also be understood as manifestations of a broader colonial system whose operation depends on institutions, policies, and ideologies that extend beyond the actions of any single perpetrator. In this sense, colonialism presents a challenge to a legal framework centered only on individual criminal responsibility, as it involves collective structures of power and long-term processes of domination by the entire state apparatus. It is a State crime.
The legal framework codified in the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility by the UN international law commission addresses internationally wrongful acts committed by states; however, it stops short of establishing their criminal responsibility. This separation exposes a deep structural gap within international law – one that ultimately reinforces systemic impunity. While individuals, (and increasingly legal persons such as corporations), may incur criminal liability, the structural mechanisms and institutional architectures that enable mass violence remain beyond the reach of criminal law.
State responsibility and the limits of the ICJ
As the principal forum for adjudicating state responsibility, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) increasingly faces cases involving acts that amount to de facto state crimes, such as genocide or torture, requiring it to assess a state’s special intent. Although the ICJ operates without the evidentiary tools or investigative mechanisms of criminal justice, relying instead on secondary materials – NGO reports, UN documents, and media sources – submitted by the parties, these proceedings nevertheless demonstrate that determinations of state or structural criminal intent are conceptually possible within international law. Yet these proceedings still fall short of criminal proceedings. This is precisely why the concept of state criminal responsibility remains important: it points to the need for legal frameworks capable of addressing not only wrongful state conduct, but also the criminality of state structures and institutions themselves.
A difference highlighted in historical comparisons lies in the fact that, unlike other colonial experiences – whether French colonization in North Africa or American expansion against Indigenous peoples – many Jewish Israelis continue to perceive themselves as fundamentally vulnerable, shaped by the memory and anticipation of another Shoah. This sense of existential insecurity, mobilized to justify the gravest forms of violence while simultaneously denying them, also constitutes a political lever for the main actors of religious Zionism. They now express their objectives more and more explicitly, making their ideology and network of practices more visible than ever – provided one is willing to stop them.
This is an edited and adapted version of an article published in the latest issue of the French magazine Esprit. Read the full original article.
Sharon Weill is a professor of international law at the American University of Paris and also teaches at Sciences Po Paris. Her research focuses on the relationship between law, conflict and judges. She is the author of The Role of National Courts in Applying International Humanitarian Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), co-editor of Prosecuting the President – The Trial of Hissène Habré (Oxford University Press, 2020) and will soon publish Terror on Trial: an Ethnography of French Court (Cambridge University Press).
