The release of Belarusian political prisoners is often interpreted by international observers as a sign of regime liberalisation and an improvement in the human rights situation. In authoritarian systems, however, such releases may also serve political and diplomatic purposes.
The developments in Belarus during 2025-2026 illustrate this pattern. Political prisoners were released in several waves, yet the mechanism of politically motivated criminal prosecution remained intact. Moreover, these releases increasingly coincided with periods of diplomatic engagement and external negotiations.
Within this model, political prisoners perform a dual function. Domestically, they remain an instrument of intimidation and control. Internationally, they become a resource that can be used in negotiations, exchanged for concessions, or presented as evidence of a willingness to engage in dialogue.
This does not mean that the waves of releases were caused solely by negotiations with the United States or by sanctions policy. The system of political persecution existed long before the current diplomatic contacts began. Since 2025, however, the release of political prisoners has increasingly been used as an external political resource.
Viewed as a whole, the events of 2025-2026 reveal a recurring pattern. New criminal cases generate new political prisoners. Some are later released and become part of the diplomatic process, while subsequent arrests replenish the system. It is this continuous reproduction of political prisoners, rather than individual releases, that helps explain the logic behind these developments.
Four waves of releases
The first major wave took place on 21 June 2025, when 14 people were released after the visit of a U.S. special envoy to Minsk. International news agencies described the release as the result of U.S. mediation and as President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko’s most significant step at that time toward easing Belarus’s international isolation. It was not followed by an end to repression. In the same month, new cases of political pressure, detentions and searches were recorded, showing that the mechanism of political persecution remained in place.
The second wave took place on 11 September 2025. Belarus released 52 people, including foreign nationals and Belarusian political prisoners. According to international news agencies, this followed an appeal by the U.S. president and came amid cautious rapprochement between Minsk and Washington. In return, the United States lifted restrictions on Belarus’s state airline.
The case of Mikola Statkevich, leader of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party “People’s Hramada”, is especially revealing. After refusing to leave Belarus, he was returned to prison. For a long time, there was no information about his whereabouts or condition. It later became known that his health had seriously deteriorated and that he had suffered a stroke. Statkevich’s case shows that the regime does not provide an alternative to forced removal from the country and, in the event of refusal, returns the person to prison.
The third wave took place on 13 December 2025. 123 people were released, including some of the most prominent political prisoners. Almost simultaneously, the United States announced the lifting of restrictions on Belarus’s potash sector, one of the regime’s key economic assets. Two days later, reports referred to sanctions relief for three Belarusian potash companies following the release of prisoners. By that point, the connection between releases and foreign-policy outcomes had become especially visible.
The fourth wave came on 19 March 2026, when 250 prisoners were released. It was the largest wave up to that point. On the same day, reports said that the United States had agreed to sanctions relief for Belarus’s financial sector, including certain banks, and had also lifted remaining restrictions on a number of entities linked to the potash industry. The U.S. special envoy then directly linked further sanctions relief to the possible release of the remaining political prisoners.
How political repression remains intact
Releases occur against the background of foreign-policy negotiations, are accompanied by diplomatic or economic outcomes, and do not lead to an end to new politically motivated cases. This repetition makes it possible to speak of an established model. Liberalisation involves more than the release of a portion of political prisoners. It requires changes to the system of political persecution itself. This would include a reduction in new politically motivated cases, greater transparency in judicial proceedings, and an end to pressure on lawyers, relatives and former political prisoners. None of this occurred.
Throughout 2025-2026, the authorities continued to initiate new politically motivated cases, rely on “extremism” charges and conduct closed proceedings. More than one thousand people remained imprisoned on political grounds at the end of 2025. In February 2026, UN experts welcomed the releases but warned that they were accompanied by forced expulsion and continued repression.
The release of political prisoners has acquired important political value for the regime. As long as new political prisoners continue to appear, their release can be used as a subject of negotiation. As a result, significance lies not only in repression as a form of punishment, but also in the system’s ability to continuously reproduce new political prisoners.
Political prisoners in Belarus are not created solely for the purpose of negotiations with the West. Their emergence is rooted in the suppression of protest, the destruction of civil society, the punishment of perceived disloyalty and the demonstration of state power. Once political prisoners already exist, however, their release can be used as a negotiating resource and acquire external political value.
The number of people released does not, by itself, indicate systemic change. As long as new politically motivated cases continue to emerge, the underlying mechanism of political persecution remains in place.
Forced exile: What happens after the release
This pattern is most visible in cases where release effectively becomes expulsion from the country. International experts have repeatedly warned that releases may be accompanied by forced exile, continued pressure and other restrictions after a person leaves prison. Joint statements by international legal and human rights organisations noted that up to 342 political prisoners were released in 2025, with more than half of them effectively expelled from Belarus.
When release is accompanied by an inability to remain safely in the country, the threat of renewed persecution or effective pressure to leave, it ceases to be a simple act of release and becomes a transformation of repression itself.
In such cases, release does not restore a person’s full freedom or legal status. Instead, it is accompanied by expulsion, legal uncertainty and the inability to return home safely. Such a mechanism allows the regime to pursue several objectives at once. In foreign policy, it creates an image of humanitarian progress. In negotiations, released political prisoners become an additional resource and a subject of discussion. In the information sphere, it allows the authorities to speak about positive developments while continuing to generate new politically motivated cases.
International attention often focuses on the moment of a prisoner’s release. Yet a proper assessment requires examining what happens afterwards. Before release, the state creates a political prisoner through criminal prosecution, closed trials, lengthy prison terms and isolation. At the moment of release, that person may become part of a negotiating process. After release, state control often persists. It may take the form of expulsion, the preservation of an unresolved criminal status, the threat of new criminal cases, the absence of guarantees for a safe return to the country, and the inability to restore violated rights.
The limits of political bargaining
The key question is not how many people have been released, but whether the state continues to create new political prisoners and preserve the mechanisms of political persecution. As long as this continues, releases alone cannot be regarded as evidence of genuine systemic change. The four waves of releases in 2025-2026 illustrate precisely this pattern. People are released, yet the mechanism that produces new political prisoners remains intact.
The Belarusian model of recent years demonstrates how repression adapts to changing political circumstances. Their release occurs not because the state has acknowledged the injustice of political persecution, but because release itself can generate political, diplomatic or economic benefits.
In this sense, the Belarusian case is relevant far beyond Belarus. It raises a broader question about how the international community engages with states that use the fate of political prisoners as an element of the negotiating process. When the release of prisoners is accompanied by diplomatic concessions, there is a risk that the system itself acquires an incentive to reproduce the same pattern.
The sequence of events in recent years suggests that political prisoners are not only victims of repression but also part of a broader political strategy. This dual function – as an instrument of domestic control and a foreign-policy resource – makes the Belarusian case relevant not only for understanding developments inside the country, but also for a wider discussion about human rights, international negotiations and the limits of acceptable political bargaining.
Aleh Baradzin, a former Belarusian political prisoner, is the founder of the independent analytical and research initiative International Institute for the Study of Political Repression and Authoritarian Systems (IISPR), and Chair of the Board of the Foundation of Belarusian Political Prisoners in Poland.
