After the historical fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the Syrian voices demanding transitional justice were very loud and clear. But for civil society organizations, victim-led groups, international legal experts, the central message to the Syrian government was clear: transitional justice is not a technical formula or a checklist of deliverables – it is a political and cultural process that must be cultivated and supported over time. If justice in Syria is to be real and lasting, it must prioritize dignity, participation, and transparency over speed and surface-level outcomes.
Despite warnings, speed, political, security situations and public pressure soon forced a certain reality on the ground. If we look at the sequence of the main waves of violence that occurred after the fall of the Assad regime and the main steps related to transitional justice, we can draw some conclusions as we approach the two-year mark of the new regime.
Pressure for a swift justice
Following outbreaks of violence and massacres in Syria’s coastal regions and Suwayda in March and July 2025 respectively, a narrative gained traction among the civil society and the public that delays in accountability were fuelling ongoing instability. Faced with mounting public outrage and demands for immediate retribution, authorities announced the creation of a National Commission for Transitional Justice (NCTJ) and of a National Commission for the Missing and Forcibly Disappeared (NCM) in April 2025, assigned the commissioners in August 2025 and formed the Fourth Criminal Court, specifically designated for transitional justice cases, in August 2026.
From April 2026, the launch of high-profile criminal justice trials in post-conflict Syria – most notably involving prominent regime figures such as Atef Najib, Wassim al-Assad, and Ahmad Hassoun – marks a pivotal historical milestone. However, these proceedings highlight a profound political and legal dilemma: the tension between the political imperative for swift justice and the legal necessity of rigorous, institutionalized due process.
The “All-or-Nothing” Trap
As civil society organizations navigate this landscape, the core argument emerges that people of Syria, after decades of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Assad regime, deserve a high standards judicial system. However, it is easy to be caught in an “all-or-nothing” trap. On one hand, rushing trials without clear statutory foundations risks producing victor’s justice and procedural vulnerabilities; on the other hand, insisting on pristine, fully modernized judicial standards before initiating prosecutions risks stalling justice entirely, alienating victims, and exacerbating security risks.
Activists rightly criticize judicial slowness, yet simultaneously demand uncompromising, high-level international standards—rejecting the use of existing, partially equipped domestic laws and institutions. However, the reality on the ground speaks a different language: building robust judicial institutions with full legal expertise and structural independence requires immense time and resources and expecting a flawless judicial apparatus overnight is unreasonable.
Additionally, accounting for the flaws in the trials without taking into consideration the heavy legacy of the judicial system from the Assad era is risking being insensitive to the Syrian context, something we should be very aware of as Syrian civil society organisations. Senior judges in the Assad government were corrupted, took part in the war crimes and sentenced thousands to death with no trials. Dealing with such legacy requires new ethical well-trained judges, who are well paid and protected from any political pressure.
A new special jurisdiction without legislation
The newly created Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus is responsible for transitional justice trials and operates under an administrative assignment rather than a clear legislative charter. While a dedicated courtroom was established in the Palace of Justice and the leadership was assigned to judge Fakhr al-Din al-Arian, there remains no explicit statutory legislation enacting the court’s special jurisdiction. Establishing specialized criminal tribunals via administrative decree rather than parliamentary legislation creates fundamental vulnerabilities regarding the principle of legality. However, going back to the Syrian reality, Syria has just recently had a functioning Parliament – officially inaugurated on July 6, 2026 – and is waiting for the Parliament to pass legislation will mean waiting at least till 2027 to have the legal framework to start any trials.
According to statements from Radeef al-Mustafa, Head of the Accountability Department in the NCTJ, the Fourth Criminal Court bench draws from both domestic Syrian law and international legal principles. For example, convictions handed down in August against Atef Najib, Wassim al-Assad and Ahmad Hassoun included intentional murder of multiple individuals, intentional murder accompanied by acts of torture and brutality against persons as crimes against humanity and war crimes, the felony of assault aiming to provoke civil war and sectarian strife, the felony of deprivation of liberty, and torture as crimes against humanity and war crimes.
It is worth highlighting that the domestic Syrian penal code hasn’t contained specific, distinct statutory provisions labelled as ‘war crimes’ or ‘crimes against humanity’. However, they were used to address past atrocities committed by the Assad regime. This hybrid approach allowed the court to charge defendants with international core crimes alongside statutory domestic offenses. However, applying international criminal standards without explicit domestic incorporation into the penal code leaves convictions open to challenges of retroactive prosecution and legal ambiguity.
A reality check is important here: how long will it take Syria to incorporate international criminal standards into domestic laws? And can Syrians wait especially when prominent figures like Hassoun, Al-Assad and Najib are captured? In addition to this dilemma, international legal experts and Syrian defence lawyers noted significant procedural flaws. The trials are monitored by tens of international and local organizations, some attending a few sessions of the trials like Human Rights Watch (HRW), others closely monitoring the process including the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Syria Justice and Accountability Centre. Experts fear that the reliance on executive expediency over structural legal reform risks compromising the long-term credibility of the verdicts.
The cases before the Fourth Criminal Court illustrate the quintessential dilemma of criminal justice. Rushing trials under ambiguous administrative decrees satisfies the urgent political need for deterrence and public demands, but it exposes the judicial process to procedural flaws and potential appeals.
Switch from “surface-level-demands” to “strategic advocacy”
To move past this paradox, civil society must move away from “all-or-nothing” positions. The path forward requires strategic priorities. Not negotiating victims full right for justice, but to be clear about our priorities, what we will never compromise on, and what we cannot move forward without. Therefore, we need to switch from ‘surface-level demands’ to ‘strategic advocacy’ based on the science of managing what’s achievable in this critical timing.
This path starts by building institutions, something that some Syrian civil society organisations are already doing; demanding justice in broken institutions is a waste of time and strategy. We should focus on fixing and strengthening institutions, not tearing them down – like some who go after national bodies, harming their credibility, reputation, or hopes, and disregarding the wins. After that, we should lean on ‘cumulative, step-by-step demands’ with a strategy of gradually raising the bar; we begin with urgent, doable demands, then build bigger ones on each success to prevent widening the gap between our ambitions and the limitations on-the-ground.
International human rights bodies – ranging from intergovernmental agencies like the OHCHR to non-governmental organizations like HRW – play a crucial role as trial observers in transitional justice settings. However, a reality check should always be the responsibility of the Syrian organisations and of the Syrian experts who should not be simplifying the complexity of the situation and refrain from repeating idealistic standards as this is not their ultimate role. They must reflect on the resources available, possible immediate, medium term and long-term strategic improvements. They should also mainly keep a close eye on the demands of the Syrian victims and survivors to ensure they do their main responsibility in managing expectations while fighting for the best future and improvements in the judicial system.
Criminal justice, and transitional justice more broadly, can be pictured as a mural or a puzzle that may not be crystal clear in every detail right now, but it has the most essential pieces that will give it its strength as a solid painting serving its fundamental purpose of preventing violence and ensuring stability. We shouldn’t be running after a ‘ghost’ of justice or a beautiful dream house that cannot be lived in. We can try to build a real ‘house’; we might not finish the roof today, but we are laying strong foundations to make sure our lives are never destroyed again.
Sana Kikhia is a Syrian activist, human rights defender and the Executive Director of the Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP). SLDP is a Syrian human rights and international law organisation founded in 2013 that works to increase the ability to achieve human rights justice in Syria. Since the fall of the Assad regime, SLDP has been engaging with the National Commission for Transitional Justice, in particular on the transitional justice law drafting process.
